Combat of Verdun | World War I

The Combat of Verdun took place on the Western Front in France from 21 February to 18 December 1916. The combat, which took place on the slopes north of Verdun-sur-Meuse, was the longest of the First World War. On the right set of the Meuse, the German 5th Army attacked the Fortified Region of Verdun and the French Second Army's defenses. The Germans hoped to conquer the Meuse Heights, an influential defensive position with an outstanding vision for artillery fire on Verdun, based on their experience during the Second Battle of Champagne in 1915. The Germans thought that by using their strategic reserve to regain their position, the French would suffer catastrophic losses at a low cost to the Germans.

The offensive was delayed due to bad weather until 21 February, but the Germans took Fort Douaumont in the first three days. Despite causing many French fatalities, the offensive halted for several days. By 6 March, the RFV had received 20+12 French divisions and a more substantial defense in depth had been built. Even though this exposed French forces to German artillery fire, Philippe Pétain ordered no retreat and counter-attacked German attacks. On 29 March, French weapons on the west side began a continuous bombardment of Germans on the east bank, resulting in numerous infantry deaths. The German onslaught was expanded to the Meuse's left bank to observe and destroy French artillery firing across the river, but the attacks fell short of their goals.

In early May, the Germans switched tactics again, launching local attacks and counter-attacks; the French retook part of Fort Douaumont, but the Germans expelled them and took numerous prisoners. In June, the Germans took Fort Vaux after alternating attacks on both sides of the Meuse. Finally, the Germans moved towards the original plan's last geographical goals, Fleury-Devant-Douaumont and Fort Souville, cutting a salient through the French defences. The Germans approached within 4 kilometers of the Verdun citadel after capturing Fleury. Still, the offensive was cut short in July to provide men, Artillery, and ammunition for the Battle of the Somme, prompting the French Tenth Army to be transferred to the Somme front as well. Fleury changed hands sixteen times between 23 June and 17 August, and a German attack on Fort Souville failed. The onslaught was scaled back even more, although ruses were deployed to keep French forces in the RFV and away from the Somme.

French counter-offensives reclaimed much of the east bank during September and December, including Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux. The flight lasted 302 days, making it the longest and most expensive in human history. Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann calculated in 2000 that the French had suffered 377,231 casualties and the Germans had suffered 337,000, for a total of 714,231 deaths and an average of 70,000 per month. William Philpott reported in 2014 that there were 976,000 casualties in 1916 and 1,250,000 in the surrounding area during the war. In France, the combat symbolized both the French Army's tenacity and the war's destructiveness.

The war of movement ended during the Battle of the Yser and the First Battle of Ypres, after the German invasion of France was halted at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914. In 1914, the Germans built field fortifications to maintain their fortifications, while the French initiated siege fighting to break through the German defences and reclaim the lost territory. Offensives on the Western Front in late 1914 and early 1915 failed to gain much ground and were exceedingly costly in terms of losses. Conferring to his autobiographies written after the war, Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff, concluded that while a decisive fight could no longer accomplish victory, the French army could still be beaten if it suffered enough fatalities. Therefore, Falkenhayn offered five strategic reserve corps for an offensive at Verdun in early February 1916, but only for an attack on the Meuse's east bank. Falkenhayn believed the French would not remain complacent in Verdun and would transfer all of their reserves there and launch a counter-offensive elsewhere or fight to retain Verdun. In contrast, the British established a rescue effort. Falkenhayn considered the last option was the most plausible after the war, according to Kaiser Wilhelm II and Gerhard Tappen, the Operations Officer of Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, General Headquarters).

The Germans hoped that by seizing or threatening to seize Verdun, the French would dispatch all of their reserves, attacking safe German defensive positions backed up by an entire artillery reserve. Instead, the German and Austro-Hungarian armies struck Russian defences frontally in the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive, pulverizing them with massive heavy Artillery. During the Second Battle of Champagne, which lasted from 25 September to 6 November 1915, the French suffered massive fatalities from German heavy Artillery, which Falkenhayn saw as a way out of the difficulty of material inferiority versus the Allies' expanding strength. A British rescue offensive in the north would wear out British reserves without having a decisive effect, but it would set the stage for a German counter-attack around Arras.

In December, Dutch military intelligence picked up on hints regarding Falkenhayn's thoughts and passed them on to the British. By relying on the capacity of heavy Artillery to inflict mass losses, the German goal was to establish a favourable operating scenario without resorting to a mass offensive, which had proven costly and ineffectual when tried by the Franco-British. A little effort at Verdun would result in the useless destruction of the French strategic reserve in counter-attacks and the defeat of British funds in a relief offensive, forcing the French to negotiate a separate peace. If the French refuse to talk, the German soldiers will attack terminally weakened Franco-British armies, clean up the remnants of the French troops, and remove the British from Europe in the second phase of the strategy. Therefore, Falkenhayn needed to keep enough of the strategic reserve for the Anglo-French relief offensives and then launch a counter-offensive, limiting the number of divisions that could be moved to the 5th Army at Verdun Unternehmen Gericht (Operation Judgement).

The Fortified Region of Verdun (RFV) was located in a salient created after the 1914 German invasion. General Joseph Joffre, the French Army's Commander-in-Chief, had determined that fixed defences had been rendered obsolete by German siege weapons following the quick capitulation of Belgian fortifications during the Battle of Liège and the Siege of Namur in 1914. The RFV was to be bare of 54 gun batteries and 128,000 rounds of ammunition, according to a General Staff instruction of 5 August 1915. By the time the German onslaught began on 21 February, plans had been prepared to defeat forts Vaux and Douaumont to deny them to the Germans, and 5,000 kg of explosives had been laid. Around Verdun, the 18 prominent forts and other batteries were left with less than 300 guns and a short supply of ammunition, and their garrisons were reduced to small maintenance personnel. The railway route from the south into Verdun was cut at the Combat of Flirey in 1914, with the cost of Saint-Mihiel; the line west from Verdun to Paris was cut in mid-July 1915 at Aubréville by the German 3rd Army, which had attacked southwards through the Argonne Forest for most of the year.

On the Meuse River, Verdun had played a crucial role in defence of the French countryside for centuries. In the fifth century, Attila the Hun failed to conquer the town. When Charlemagne's dominion was partitioned under the Treaty of Verdun, the city became part of the Holy Roman Empire; in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia granted Verdun to France. A castle built by Vauban in the 17th century stood at the centre of the city. Around Verdun, a double ring of 28 forts and lesser works was constructed on commanding territory, at least 150 meters above the river valley and 2.5–8 kilometres from the citadel. In the 1870s, Séré de Rivières designed a plan to construct two lines of fortresses, one from Belfort to Épinal and the other from Verdun to Toul, as defensive screens and to surround towns that would serve as counter-attack bases. With a renovation program that began in the 1880s at Douaumont, many of the Verdun forts had been modernized and rendered more resistant to Artillery. In addition, a sand cushion was constructed, and thick, steel-reinforced concrete topped up to 2.5 meters wide, buried under 1–4 meters of dirt. The forts and ouvrages were positioned to see each other for mutual support, and the outer ring was 45 kilometres in circumference. The outer defences had 79 guns in shellproof turrets and more than 200 light guns and machine guns to cover the forts' ditches. Sixteen regiments featured retractable twin 75 mm turrets, and six had 155 mm guns in retractable turrets.

Douaumont received a new concrete bunker with two 75 mm field cannons in 1903 to protect the south-western approach and defensive works along the ridge to Ouvrage de Froideterre. From 1903 through 1913, four retractable steel turrets were built with more weapons. The guns could swivel for all-around defence, while two smaller versions held twin Hotchkiss machine guns in the fort's north-eastern and north-western corners. To cover the gaps between forts, one armoured turret with a 155 mm short-barrelled gun faced north and northeast on the east side of the defence, while another contained twin 75 mm guns on the north end. The settlement, fort, six ouvrages, five shelters, six concrete batteries, an underground infantry shelter, two ammunition depots, and several concrete infantry trenches were all part of the complex at Douaumont. Between the forts of Verdun, there was a network of concrete infantry shelters, armoured observation posts, batteries, concrete trenches, command posts, and underground caves. The Artillery consisted of approximately 1,000 pieces, with 250 in reserve. The forts and ouvrages were connected by telephone and telegraph, a narrow-gauge railway system, and a road network; the RFV had a garrison of 66,000 men with six-month rations when it was mobilized.

The mainline Paris–St Menehould–Les Islettes–Clermont-en-Argonne–Aubréville–Verdun railroad in the Forest of Argonne was blocked in mid-July 1915 after Verdun had been isolated on three sides since 1914. After a series of minor strokes, the 5th Army's right flank units reached the La Morte Fille–Hill 285 ridge, rendering the railway useless. Only a light railway was left to transport bulk supplies, as German-controlled railways were only 24 kilometres north of the front line. A corps was sent to the 5th Army to help with attack preparations. Buildings were requisitioned, and areas were cleared of French civilians. Thousands of kilometres of phone cable were laid, and a massive amount of ammunition and supplies were dumped undercover and hundreds of guns positioned and disguised. Ten additional rail lines with twenty stops were erected, and concrete underground bunkers ranged from 4.5 to 14 meters deep, each holding 1,200 German men.

The III, VII, and XVIII Corps were assigned to the 5th Army, with each corps receiving 2,400 veteran troops and 2,000 trained recruits as reinforcements. When the assault divisions moved up, V Corps was stationed behind the front line, ready to advance if required. The XV Corps, which consisted of two divisions, was stationed in the 5th Army reserve, prepared to move and mop up if the French defence crumbled. During the attack, unique plans were made to maintain a high rate of artillery fire; 33+1⁄2 ammunition trains each day were to transport enough ammunition to fire 2,000,000 rounds in the first six days and another 2,000,000 shells in the next twelve. Five repair facilities were created near the front to prevent maintenance delays, and factories in Germany were quickly prepared to rebuild Artillery in need of more significant repairs. Undercover mortars and super-heavy Artillery, a redeployment strategy was planned to move field guns and mobile heavy Artillery forward. On the Verdun front, 1,201 firearms were massed, with two-thirds of the heavy and super-heavy Artillery obtained by removing modern German Artillery from the rest of the Western Front and replacing them with older varieties captured Russian and Belgian guns. Thus, the German Artillery could fire from three directions into the Verdun salient while remaining dispersed about the boundaries.

The 5th Army separated the attack front into four areas: A, which was occupied by the VII Reserve Corps, B, which the XVIII Corps occupied, C, which the III Corps occupied, and D, which was occupied by the XV Corps in the Wovre plain. On the morning of 12 February, the preliminary artillery bombardment was to commence. Infantry in zones A through C would move in open order at 5:00 p.m., backed up by grenade and flamethrower detachments. The French advanced trenches were to be manned if practicable, and the second position reconnoitred for artillery bombardment on the second day. The Weaponry, which was to carry the burden of the aggressive in a series of large attacks with limited objectives, was to take the responsibility of the offensive in a series of large attacks with limited purposes, to maintain a relentless pressure on the French, was to be sent to follow up destructive bombardments by the infantry. The Meuse Heights, which ran from Froide Terre to Fort Souville and Fort Tavannes and provided a safe defensive position to fight French counter-attacks, were the initial targets. The 5th Army staff coined the term relentless pressure, which generated confusion about the offensive's purpose. Falkenhayn desired to gain ground from which Artillery could dominate the battlefield, while the 5th Army wanted to capture Verdun quickly. The ambiguity's perplexity was left to the corps headquarters to figure out.

An Order for the Activities of the Weaponry and Mortars centralized control of the Artillery, stating that local target selection was the responsibility of the corps Generals of Foot Artillery. In contrast, coordination of flanking fire by neighbouring corps and the fire of sure Artillery was the responsibility of the 5th Army headquarters. The strongest howitzers and enfilade fire were to be used against the French defences. Heavy Artillery maintained long-range bombardment of French supply routes and assembly areas, while specialist Artillery firing gas shells provided counter-battery fire. Artillery and infantry cooperation was emphasized, with artillery precision taking precedence over the rate of fire. The first bombardment would be gradual, with Trommelfeuer not starting until the last hour. Then, the Artillery would increase the barrage range as the infantry advanced, destroying the French second position. Field telephones, lights, and coloured balloons were to be used by artillery observers to communicate with the guns as they advanced with the troops. The French were to be bombarded continuously when the onslaught began, with harassing fire maintained at night.

The RFV forts had 237 guns and 647 long tons of ammunition removed in 1915, leaving only the heavier guns in retractable turrets. After resources were deployed west from Verdun for the Second Battle of Champagne, the conversion of the RFV to a traditional linear defence with trenches and barbed wire began but progressed slowly. Construction on the first, second, and third trench lines started in October 1915. General Nol de Castelnau, Chief of Staff at French General Headquarters (GQG), in January 1916, found the new defences to be satisfactory, with minor flaws in three sections. The garrisons of the fortresses had been reduced to little maintenance personnel, and some of the forts were slated for demolition. When the XXX Corps leader, Major-General Paul Chrétien, tried to examine Fort Douaumont in January 1916, he was denied admission.

Douaumont was the RFV's largest fort, and by February 1916, the 75 mm and 155 mm turret guns and light guns guarding the ditch were the only weaponry remaining in the defence. Sixty-eight technicians were stationed at the fort under the supervision of Warrant Officer Chenot, the Gardien de Batterie. One of the revolving 155 mm turrets was manned partially, while the other was left unmanned. The Hotchkiss machine guns were packed in crates, and four 75 mm guns had already been removed from the casemates. A German shell had jammed the drawbridge in the down position, and it had not been rebuilt. The coffres with Hotchkiss revolver-cannons guarding the moats were unmanned, and the fort had been demolished with almost 5,000 kg of explosives. Colonel Émile Driant, stationed at Verdun, chastised Joseph Joffre for evacuating Artillery and men from Verdun's fortifications. Colonel Driant acknowledged the assist of the Minister of War, Joseph Gallieni, who did not listen to Joffre. The robust Verdun defences were a shell, and a German onslaught threatened them; events would prove Driant correct.

Due to the absence of a clear tactical objective, French intelligence accurately assessed German military capacity and intentions at Verdun in late January 1916. Still, Joffre believed that an attack would be a diversion. Joffre expected a massive onslaught elsewhere when the German offensive began. Still, he eventually caved into political pressure and sent the VII Corps to Verdun on 23 January to maintain the west bank's north face. Herr had 8+1⁄2 disunions in the front line, with 2+1⁄2 disunions in adjacent reserve, while XXX Corps held the salient east of the Meuse to the north and north-east, and II Corps maintained the eastern face of the Meuse Heights. The I and XX corps had two divisions in reserve and the majority of the 19th Disunion; Joffre had 25 disunions in the French tactical account. At Verdun, French artillery reinforcements boosted the total to 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns, compared to 1,201 German firearms, two-thirds of which were heavy and super heavy, including 14-inch and 16-inch mortars. The 5th Army also received eight specialised flamethrower companies.

On 25 February, Castelnau met with De Langle de Cary, who thought the east bank could be defended. Castelnau disagreed and instructed the corps commander, General Frédéric-Georges Herr, to retain the right bank of the Meuse at all costs. Herr dispatched a division from the west bank and directed the XXX Corps to maintain a line stretching from Bras to Douaumont, Vaux, and Eix. At 11:00 p.m., Pétain seized charge of the RFV's defence, with Colonel Maurice de Barescut as main of staff and Colonel Bernard Serrigny as head of operations, only to find out that Fort Douaumont had fallen. The enduring Verdun forts were to be re-garrisoned, according to Pétain. Generals Balfourier, Adolphe Guillaumat, and Denis Duchêne ordered on the right bank, while on the left bank, Georges de Bazelaire commanded. A line of resistance was built on the east bank, from Souville to Thiaumont, around Fortress Douaumont to Fortress Vaux, Moulainville, and sideways the Wovre ridge. The line stretched from Cumières to Mort Homme, Côte 304, and Avocourt on the west bank. As the last line of defence north of Verdun, a panic line was secretly planned through the forts of Belleville, St. Michel, and Moulainville. From the 24th to 26 February, I Corps and XX Corps arrived, bringing the total number of disunions in the RFV to 14+1⁄2. The arrival of the XIII, XXI, XXIV, and XXXIII corps on 6 March brought 20+1⁄2 divisions.

The operation was supposed to start on 12 February, but fog, heavy rain, and high winds delayed it until 7:15 a.m. on 21 February, when a 10-hour artillery bombardment with 808 guns began. Around 1,000,000 shells were fired by German Artillery along a 30-kilometre-long, 5-kilometre-wide front. The fire was mainly concentrated on the right bank of the Meuse River. Twenty-six super-heavy, long-range weapons with a range of up to 420 mm fired on the forts and the city of Verdun, causing a 160-kilometre rumble.

As a deception to get French survivors to reveal themselves, the bombardment was suspended around midday. As a result, German artillery-observation planes were free to fly above the battlefield unmolested by French aircraft. At 4:00 p.m., the III Corps, VII Corps, and XVIII Corps attacked; the Germans employed flamethrowers, and stormtroopers followed closely behind with rifles slung, killing the surviving defenders with hand grenades. Captain Willy Rohr and Sturm-Bataillon Nr. 5, the battalion that carried out the attack, devised this strategy. Although French survivors battled the assault, the Germans only suffered about 600 casualties.

By 22 February, German regiment had advanced 5 kilometres and taken the Bois des Caures, on the outskirts of Flabas. Colonel Émile Driant's two French battalions held the bois for two days until being forced back to Samogneux, Beaumont-en-Auge, and Ornes. Only 118 of the Chasseurs succeeded to escape when Driant was slain while battling the 56th and 59th Bataillons de chasseurs à pied. Due to a lack of information, the French High Command only realized the attack was severe after that. The Germans were able to seize Haumont, while French soldiers could repel a German attack on Bois de l'Herbebois. A French counter-offensive at Bois des Caures was defeated on 23 February.

The battle for Bois de l'Herbebois raged on until the Germans outflanked the French defenders in Bois de Wavrille. During their attack on Bois de Fosses, the German assailants sustained numerous fatalities, while the French held on to Samogneux. On 24 February, German attacks resumed, forcing the French XXX Corps out of the second line of defence; the XX Corps arrived last and was rushed forward. According to Castelnau, the Second Army, under General Pétain, should be despatched to the RFV that evening. The Germans had taken Beaumont-en-Verdunois, the Bois des Fosses, and the Bois des Caurières, and were making their way up the Hassoule ravin to Fort Douaumont.

The infantry of Brandenburg Regiment 24 moved side by side with the II and III battalions, each arranged into two waves of two companies each, at 3:00 p.m. on 25 February. Due to a delay in delivering orders to the flanking regiments, the III Battalion advanced without support on that side. With machine-gun fire from the edge of Bois Hermitage, the Germans stormed French positions in the woods and on Côte 347. French on Côte 347 were outmaneuvered and removed to Douaumont village, the German army seized several prisoners. The German forces arrived at their targets in under twenty minutes and pursued the French until a machine cannon in Douaumont church opened fire on them. When German Artillery began to shell the area after the gunners refused to trust allegations sent by field telephone that the German soldiers were within a few hundred meters of the fort, some German troops took cover in forests and a ravine leading to the defence. Several German groups were obliged to advance to locate bodies from German shelling, and two of them independently made their way to the fort. Since most of the Verdun fortresses had been largely disarmed by German super-heavy Krupp 420 mm mortars after the demolition of Belgian fortifications in 1914, the Germans were unaware that the French garrison was made up of only a tiny maintenance crew overseen by a warrant officer.

The German party of about 100 soldiers attempted to alert the guns with flares, but the twilight and heavy snow concealed them. While French machine-gun fire from Douaumont village subsided, several of the party began to cut through the fort's wire. The French had realized the German blazes and assumed that the Germans on the defence were Zouaves fleeing Côte 378. Before the French started shooting, the Germans were able to approach the fort's northeast end. Because the machine-gun bunkers at each corner of the ditch had been left unguarded, the German group discovered a way through the railings on top of the trench and climbed down without being shot on. The German parties continued onwards, passing through one of the fort's vacant ditch bunkers before arriving at the principal Rue de Rempart.

After creeping stealthily inside, the Germans heard noises. They persuaded a French prisoner caught at an observation position to accompany them to the lower floor. They arrested Warrant Officer Chenot and about 25 French men, the fort's skeleton garrison. On 26 February, the Germans had moved 3 kilometres over a 10-kilometre front; French losses were 24,000 troops, while German losses totalled around 25,000 men. After an unsuccessful counter-attack on Fort Douaumont, Pétain ordered that no further attempts be made; existing lines were to be strengthened, and other forts were to be seized, rearmed and supplied such that they could resist a siege if they were encircled.

After a thaw turned the land into a marsh and French troops boosted the defence's efficiency, the German offensive gained little headway on 27 February. Some German guns became unusable, while others were trapped in the mud. In action near Douaumont village, German forces suffered from weariness and sustained unexpectedly significant losses, with 500 casualties. The German attack was halted at Douaumont on 29 February, thanks to heavy snowfall and the French 33rd Infantry Regiment's defence. Due to the delays, the French could transport 90,000 men and 23,000 short tons of ammunition from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. The rapid German advance had outrun the range of Artillery covering fire, and the muddy circumstances made moving the Artillery forward as anticipated extremely difficult. The German advance southwards brought it into the range of French artillery west of the Meuse, resulting in more significant German infantry casualties than in previous battles, when French infantry on the east bank had fewer guns to support them.

Falkenhayn had expected French Artillery on the west bank to be suppressed by counter-battery fire before the advance, but this had not happened. The Germans established a specialised artillery corps to counter French artillery bombardment from the west bank, but it failed to reduce German infantry deaths. In late February, the 5th Army requested additional men. Still, Falkenhayn declined due to the quick advance already made on the east bank and the fact that he needed the balance of the OHL reserve for an offensive elsewhere once the battle at Verdun had attracted and consumed French resources. The slowdown in the German assault on 27 February caused Falkenhayn to second-guess whether to end the offensive or reinforce it. On 29 February, Knobelsdorf wrested two divisions from the OHL reserve, promising that once the west bank heights were occupied, the east bank offensive could be finished. The X Reserve Corps reinforced the VI Reserve Corps to take a line from Avocourt south to Côte 304 north of Esnes, Bois des Cumières, Le Mort Homme, and Côte 205, from which the French Weaponry on the west bank could be demolished.

On the west bank, the Artillery of the two-corps assault group was strengthened by 25 heavy artillery batteries, artillery command was centralized under one officer, and arrangements were made for the east bank artillery to fire in support. General Heinrich von Gossler prepared the attack in two stages, beginning on 6 March with Mort-Homme and Côte 265 and ending on 9 March with attacks on Avocourt and Côte 304. The German bombardment decreased the summit of Côte 304 from 304 meters to 300 meters; Mort-Homme offered cover for French field artillery, which slowed German progress towards Verdun on the right bank; and the slopes afforded magnificent views of the left bank. The Germans made another assault on Mort-Homme on 9 March, this time from the direction of Béthincourt to the northwest, after storming the Bois des Corbeaux and losing it to a French counter-attack. Before the Germans took sections of Mort-Homme, Côte 304, Cumières, and Chattancourt on 14 March, Bois des Corbeaux again at a high cost in fatalities.

The German offensive had reached the first-day objectives after a week, only to discover that French Artillery behind Côte de Marre and Bois Bourrus were still firing, causing numerous Germans on the east side. German Artillery pushed to Côte 265 but was met with systematic artillery fire from the French, forcing the Germans to launch the second phase of the west bank attack to safeguard the gains made in the first. Thus, German attacks shifted from large-scale operations on broad fronts to focused strikes with specific goals.

Côte 265 at the west close of Mort-Homme was captured by a German attack on 14 March, but Côte 295 at the east end was held by the French 75th Infantry Brigade. The 11th Bavarian and 11th Reserve divisions confronted Bois d'Avocourt and Bois de Malancourt on 20 March, after receiving a bombardment of 13,000 trench mortar rounds. They quickly achieved their original objectives. However, Gossler called a halt to the assault to consolidate the seized territory and prepare for another massive bombardment the next day. Two divisions attacked "Termite Hill" at Côte 304 on 22 March. Still, they were met by a barrage of artillery fire, which also hit assembly centres and German lines of communication, thus stopping the German advance.

The small German success had been costly, and as the German forces attempted to dig in, French fire caused further fatalities. Gossler had taken Bois de Malancourt at the cost of 20,000 lives by 30 March, but the Germans were still short of Côte 304. On 30 March, reinforcements came in the XXVII Reserve Corps, and General Max von Gallwitz assumed command of a new Attack Group West. Milan court village fell on 31 March, Haucourt on 5 April, and Béthincourt on 8 April. German attacks near Vaux touched Bois Caillette and the Vaux–Fleury railroad, but the French 5th Division was repulsed on the east side. The Germans launched an offensive on both banks at midday on 9 April, with five divisions on the left bank, but were rebuffed save at Mort-Homme, where the French 42nd Division was thrown back from the northeast face. An attack on Côte-du-Poivre from the right bank failed.

The German attacks in March had no advantage of surprise, and they were up against a determined and well-supplied foe in superior defensive positions. German Artillery could still wreak havoc on French defensive positions, but it couldn't stop French Artillery from killing many German foot soldiers and cutting them off from their supplies. Massed artillery fire enabled German troops to make minor advances. Still, massed French artillery fire did the same for French infantry when they counter-attacked, often repulsing the German infantry and subjecting them to continual losses, even when conquered land was held. The German struggle on the west bank also demonstrated that capturing a critical point was insufficient because it would be discovered to be overlooked by another terrain feature, which would have to be caught to ensure the defence of the original issue, making it impossible for the Germans to end their attacks unless they were willing to retreat to the original front line of February 1916.

By the end of March, the Germans had suffered 81,607 fatalities, and Falkenhayn was considering calling the attack off, lest it turns into another costly and indecisive battle like the First Battle of Ypres in late 1914. On 31 March, the 5th Army staff sought additional troops from Falkenhayn, citing an optimistic assessment that the French were near fatigued and unable of launching a major offensive. The 5th Army hoped to keep the east bank offensive going until they reached a line stretching from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville, and Fort de Tavannes, while their counter-attacks would annihilate the French on the west bank. On 4 April, Falkenhayn responded that the French had kept a significant reserve and that German resources were limited and insufficient to replenish personnel and munitions continually. Falkenhayn was willing to admit defeat and call off the offensive on the east bank if the offensive failed to reach Meuse Heights.

After the failure of German advances by Angriffsgruppe Ost in early April, Knobelsdorf sought input from the 5th Army corps commanders, who unanimously desired to press on. However, the German infantry was subjected to continual artillery bombardment from the flanks and rear and communications from the rear and reserve positions, resulting in a steady flow of casualties. In addition, existing defensive positions had been swept away by German bombardments early in operation, leaving German forces with minimal cover, making defensive positions impossible to construct. General Berthold von Deimling, commander of the XV Corps, also claimed that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were eroding German troop morale, forcing them to press on to safer defensive positions. On 20 April, Knobelsdorf presented his results to Falkenhayn, stating that if the Germans did not advance, they would be forced to return to the start line of 21 February.

Knobelsdorf opposed Mudra's limited piecemeal attacks as leader of Angriffsgruppe Ost and instead urged for a resumption to wide-front attacks with unlimited targets, fast reaching the line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville, and Fort de Tavannes. Falkenhayn was convinced to agree to the shift, and by the end of April, 21 divisions, the majority of the OHL reserve, and troops from the Eastern Front had been transported to Verdun. Both sides paid a high price for resorting to significant, unrestricted attacks, but the German progress was gradual. The Germans inflicted casualties by attacks that provoked French counter-attacks, rather than causing devastating French deaths by heavy Artillery with the infantry insecure defensive positions, which the French were compelled to attack. It was assumed that the process resulted in five French casualties for two German losses.

After the corps commanders were given the discretion to choose between Falkenhayn's cautious, step-by-step tactics and maximum effort, meant to achieve immediate results, Falkenhayn urged the 5th Army in mid-March to deploy tactics designed to conserve infantry. The 6th Disunion of the III Corps had ordered Herbebois to be taken regardless of loss on the third day of the operation, and the 5th Division had stormed Wavrille with the help of its band. Falkenhayn pushed the 5th Army to attack in front of the main infantry body with Stoßtruppen (storm troops) made up of two infantry squads and one engineer squad, armed with automatic guns, hand grenades, trench mortars, and flamethrowers. The Stoßtruppen would use clever topography to hide their approach and take any remaining blockhouses following the artillery setup. Strongholds that couldn't be conquered were bypassed and captured by reinforcements. The command of the field and heavy artillery units were to be integrated, with a commander at each corps headquarters, according to Falkenhayn. Batteries in different locations would bring targets under converging fire, which would be allotted systematically to support divisions, thanks to familiar observers and communication systems.

Because the new soldiers at Verdun had not been trained in these ways, Falkenhayn ordered the infantry to approach close to the barrage to utilise the shellfire's neutralising impact on surviving defenders. Knobelsdorf insisted on maintaining momentum, although limited attacks with pauses to consolidate and prepare were incompatible with casualty conservation. Disagreeing commanders, such as Mudra, were fired. Falkenhayn also intervened to alter German defensive tactics, suggesting a dispersed defence with the second line as a key resistance line and a launching pad for counter-attacks. Machine guns were to be stationed in overlapping fields of fire, with soldiers assigned to specific defence zones. When the French troops attacked, Sperrfeuer was supposed to confine them on their last front line, increasing French infantry fatalities. Falkenhayn's desired adjustments had little effect because artillery fire was the principal cause of German casualties, just as it was for the French.

Since 10 May, German actions have been limited to local attacks, either in response to French counter attacks on 11 April between Douaumont and Vaux and 17 April between the Meuse and Douaumont, or local attempts to seize tactically important positions. General Pétain was promoted to command of the Groupe d'armées du Centre (GAC) in early May, while General Robert Nivelle assumed command of the Second Army at Verdun. German attacks on the west bank surrounding Mort-Homme lasted from 4 to 24 May, with the north slope of Côte 304 being taken on 4 May; French counter-attacks on 5 and 6 May were rebuffed. The French troops on the crest of Côte 304 were beaten back on 7 May, but German infantry could not take the hill due to the ferocity of French artillery fire. On 24 May, Cumieres and Curettes surrendered to a French counter-offensive launched from Fort Douaumont.

General Nivelle, who had seized charge of the Second Army, ordered the commander of the 5th Division, General Charles Mangin, to plan a counter-attack on Fort Douaumont in May. The initial plan called for a 3-kilometre frontal assault, but several minor German attacks on the fort's southeast and west sides captured the Fausse-Côte and Couleuvre ravines. A second attack gained the ridge south of the Couleuvre ravin, giving the Germans greater counter-attack and observation paths across the French lines to the south and southwest. Mangin planned a pre-emptive attack to recover the ravine region and blockade the channels through which a German counter attack on the fort could be launched. More divisions were required, but they were refused to save men for the next Somme offensive; Mangin was confined to one Division for the attack and one in reserve. Nivelle narrowed the attack to Morchée Trench, Bonnet-d'Evèque, Fontaine Trench, Fort Douaumont, a machine-gun turret, and Hongrois Trench requiring a 500-meter advance on a 1,150-meter front.

Later in May 1916, the German confronts shifted from the left bank to the right bank, south of Fort Douaumont, at Mort-Homme and Côte 304. The German attack on the last French defensive line, Fleury Ridge, commenced. The attack was aimed at Ouvrage de Thiaumont, Fleury, Fort Souville, and Fort Vaux, which were at the north-east end of the French line and had been bombarded with 8,000 shells per day since the offensive began. The summit of Fort Vaux was seized on 2 June after a final assault by around 10,000 German forces on 1 June. Fighting continued underground until the garrison ran out of water on 7 June, when the 574 survivors surrendered. The Line of Panic was engaged, and trenches erected on the outskirts of Verdun as news of the loss of Fort Vaux reached the city. The Germans advanced from the Côte 304, Mort-Homme, and Cumières lines on the left bank, threatening the French position on Chattancourt and Avocourt. Heavy rains halted the German assault on Fort Souville, and for the following two months, both armies fought and counter-attacked. From 1 June to 10, the 5th Army lost 2,742 troops in the neighbourhood of Fort Vaux, with 381 killed, 2,170 wounded, and 191 missing; French counter-attacks on June 8 and 9 were expensive failures.

On 22 June, the German Artillery launched approximately 116,000 Diphosgene (Green Cross) gas shells into French artillery positions, killing over 1,600 people and silencing several French weapons. The Germans assaulted on a 5-kilometre front the next day at 5:00 a.m., driving a three by 2 km salient into the French defences. Until 9:00 a.m., when few French minitaries could engage a rearguard action, the advance was unchallenged. The communities of Fleury and Chapelle Sainte-Fine were overwhelmed, and the Ouvrage de Froidterre and the Ouvrage de Thiaumont at the south close of the plateau were seized. The attack reached within 5 kilometres of the Verdun fortress, which approximately 38,000 shells had struck since April.

One of the intended goals of the February offensive was Fort Souville, which topped a crest 1 km southeast of Fleury. The Germans would gain control of the heights overlooking Verdun if the fort was taken, allowing the soldiers to dig in on commanding terrain. On 9 July, a German preparatory bombardment began, with nearly 60,000 gas shells fired to silence French Artillery, which had little impact because the French had been outfitted with an upgraded M2 gas mask. In addition, more than 300,000 shells were fired at Fort Souville and its approaches, including around 500 360 mm shells on the fort.

On 11 July, three German divisions launched an offensive, but German forces gathered on the path leading to Fort Souville and were bombarded by French fire. Sixty French machine-gunners came from the fort and took positions on the superstructure, firing on the surviving troops. Finally, on 12 July, thirty soldiers from Infantry Regiment 140 climbed to the top of the fort, where the Germans could see the roofs of Verdun and the cathedral's spire. The survivors returned to their starting lines or surrendered after a brief French counter-attack. Crown Prince Wilhelm was instructed to go on the defensive by Falkenhayn on the evening of 11 July, and the French launched a more vigorous counter-attack on 15 July, which gained no ground; the French made only minor attacks for the rest of the month.

On 1 August, a German surprise attack advanced 800–900 meters towards Fort Souville, prompting two weeks of French counter-attacks that only managed to regain a small portion of the lost land. Fleury was recaptured on 18 August, and French counter-attacks had reclaimed much of the terrain lost in July and August by September. First Quartermaster-General Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg succeeded Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff on August 29. On 3 September, a flanking attack at Fleury advanced the French line several hundred meters, despite German counter-attacks on the 4th and 5th of September. The French assaulted again on September 9, 13, and 15–17. Except for 474 French troops killed in a fire that started on 4 September in the Tavannes railway tunnel, there were few casualties.

In October 1916, the French launched the First Offensive Battle of Verdun, a 2-kilometre offensive to recover Fort Douaumont. By mid-October, seven of Verdun's 22 divisions had been replaced, and French infantry platoons had been reorganized to include riflemen, grenadiers, and machine-gunners sections. During a six-day preliminary bombardment, French Artillery fired 855,264 shells from more than 700 guns and howitzers, including more than half a million 75 mm field-gun shells, a hundred thousand 155 mm medium artillery shells, and 373 370 mm and 400 mm super-heavy projectiles.

The 400 mm super-heavy shells, each weighing one short ton, were fired by two French Saint-Chamond railway guns located 13 kilometres to the southwest at Baleycourt. On the right bank, the French had identified approximately 800 German guns proficient of assisting the 34th, 54th, 9th, and 33rd Reserve disunions, with the 10th and 5th disunions as a backup. At least 20 super-heavy shells were fired at Fort Douaumont, with the sixth piercing to the lowermost level and exploding in a pioneer depot, igniting 7,000 hand grenades.

Pétain and Nivelle planned the Second Offensive Battle of Verdun, which Mangin led. With four more divisions in reserve and 740 heavy guns in support, the 126th, 38th, 37th, and 133rd divisions were assaulted. Later a six-day bombardment of 1,169,000 rounds fired from 827 guns, the attack commenced on 15 December. The final French barrage was dropped on trenches, dugout entrances, and observation posts by artillery-observation planes. Five German divisions, supported by 533 guns, defended a 2,300-meter-deep defensive position, with 2⁄3 of the men in the battle zone and the remaining 13% in reserve 10–16 kilometres away.

The German strategy in 1916 aimed to weaken the French Army to the point of collapse by inflicting significant deaths on them. Thus, an objective was attained against the Russians from 1914 to 1915. For strategic and prestige considerations, the French Army had to be drawn into situations it could not escape. The Germans intended to utilize heavy and super-heavy guns to inflict more fatalities than the French Artillery, who primarily relied on the 75 mm field gun. Contrary to the opinions of Wolfgang Foerster in 1937, Gerd Krumeich in 1996, and others, Robert Foley argued in 2007 that Falkenhayn wanted a campaign of attrition from the start. Still, the loss of documentation led to numerous interpretations of the strategy. Critics of Falkenhayn argued in 1916 that the combat illustrated his indecisiveness and unsuitability for command, a claim reiterated by Foerster in 1937. Holger Afflerbach cross-examined the legitimacy of the Christmas Memorandum in 1994; after studying the evidence preserved in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres files, he concluded that the memorandum was written after the war but accurately reflected Falkenhayn's thinking at the time.

The Christmas Memorandum, according to Krumeich, was made up to defend a failed strategy, and attrition had been substituted for the seizure of Verdun only after the onslaught had failed. Falkenhayn had returned to the pre-war tactical thinking of Moltke the Elder and Hans Delbrück on Ermattungsstrategie following the loss of the Ypres Offensive in 1914, according to Foley, since the coalition against Germany was too powerful to be defeated decisively. Falkenhayn hoped to split the Allies by compelling at least one of the Entente states to accept a negotiated peace. The offensive in the east in 1915 was an attempt at attrition, but the Russians had declined to accept German peace antennae, despite the Austro-Germans' massive defeats.

With inadequate forces to break through the Western Front and beat the reserves behind it, Falkenhayn attempted to persuade the French to strike by threatening a sensitive site near the front line, and he chose Verdun. German Artillery on the city's commanding heights was to inflict massive damage on the French. The 5th Army would launch a massive onslaught to capture the Meuse Heights on the east side so that German heavy Artillery could dominate the battlefield. In futile counter-attacks, the French Army would bleed to death. The British would be compelled to mount a rapid relief offensive, which would cost them dearly. If the French refused to talk, a German onslaught would annihilate the Franco-British armies, effectively ending the Entente.

The Germans claimed they were inflicting losses at a 5:2 ratio; German military intelligence believed the French had suffered 100,000 casualties by 11 March. Falkenhayn believed German Artillery could easily inflict another 100,000 deaths. Falkenhayn estimated that French casualties had risen to 525,000 troops vs 250,000 Germans in May and that the French strategic reserve had been reduced to 300,000 men. By 1 May, the French had suffered approximately 130,000 casualties; the noria system had withdrawn and rested 42 French divisions after infantry fatalities hit 50%. Two hundred fifty-nine infantry battalions from the French metropolitan army were sent to Verdun, where they faced 48 German divisions, accounting for 25% of the Westheimer. According to Afflerbach, 85 French divisions fought at Verdun, and the ratio of German to French losses from February to August was 1:1.1, not the third of French losses assumed by Falkenhayn. The 5th Military had suffered 281,000 casualties by 31 August, while the French had suffered 315,000.

According to Paul Jankowski, since the beginning of the conflict, French army units have produced numerical loss states every five days for the Bureau of Personnel at GQG. Casualty data was spread among regimental depots, GQG, the Registry Office, which documented the Service de Santé, deaths, which counted injuries and illnesses, and Renseignements aux Familles, which connected with next of kin. The Première Bureau of GQG began comparing the five-day états numériques des pertes with hospital admissions records, and regimental depots were ordered to keep fiches de position to record losses continuously. The new system was used to compute losses dating back to August 1914, which took several months; by February 1916, the system had become established. The casualty figures published in the Journal of Officiel, the French Official History, and other publications were calculated using the états numériques des parties.

Every ten days, the German armies compiled Verlustlisten, which were published in the Deutsches Jahrbuch of 1924–1925 by the Reichsarchiv. Medical units in Germany kept meticulous treatment records at the front and in hospitals. The Zentral Nachweiseamt released an improved edition of the lists compiled during the war in 1923, which included medical service data not contained in the Verlustlisten. In 1934, the Sanitätsbericht released monthly data of injured and ill personnel who received medical treatment. It's difficult to compare data from such sources because it is based on losses over time rather than location. As seen in the British Empire's Military Effort Statistics during the Great War 1914–1920, battle losses can be inconsistent. Louis Marin testified to the Chamber of Deputies in the early 1920s. Still, he could not provide figures for each combat, except for a few that were based on numerical reports from the troops, which were unreliable unless reconciled with the 1916 system.