Mongol Military Tactics and Organisations

The Mongol Empire conquered virtually all of continental Asia and sections of the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The growth of the Mongol nomadic lifestyle was the foundation of that system. Genghis Khan, his generals, and his successors invented different components. Other cultures' technologies for assaulting fortresses were adapted. The leadership structure was expanded to include foreign technical specialists. As a result, the Mongols were often victorious over far bigger forces. It was illegal to transfer personnel between units. Each level's commanders had considerable latitude in carrying out their commands in the manner they saw fit. This command system was extremely adaptable, allowing the Mongol army to assault in large numbers, separate into smaller units to encircle their opponents, and either lead them into an ambush or clean up a fleeing and broken army. Individual troops were responsible for their equipment, weapons, and up to five horses, even though they fought as a unit. On overseas excursions, their families and herds would follow them. An elite troop known as Kheshig stood out among the other forces. They served as the Mongol Empire's imperial guard and a training ground for aspiring young commanders. The Kheshig was where Subutai, a renowned Mongol general, began his career.

Each Mongol soldier usually kept three or four horses. Changing horses allowed them to travel at great speeds for days without halting or exhausting the horses. The rider would dismount and switch horses when one grew fatigued. Even though the utilised horse would still have to move, it would do it without the rider's weight. Their capacity to existing off the soil, and in extreme cases, off their animals (particularly mare's milk), rendered their forces considerably less reliant on agricultural armies' typical logistical machinery. They travelled up to 160 kilometres a day in some cases, such as during the invasion of Hungary in early 1241, which was unheard of by other forces at the time.

Individual troops' mobility allowed them to embark on effective scouting trips, gather information about routes, and look for terrain that suited the Mongols' favoured battle tactics. The Mongols utilised frozen rivers as roads during their invasion of Kievan Rus'. Winter, which is typically off-limits for any substantial operation due to the extreme cold, became the Mongols' favoured season to strike. Enemies would often spread out or seek cover to avoid the lethal hail of missiles, breaking up their formations and leaving them more vulnerable to the lancers' charges. Similarly, when they grouped in tight square or phalanx formations, they made themselves more vulnerable to arrows. The noyans would issue the command once the adversary had been sufficiently weakened. The lancers would charge forward as the drums hammered and the signal flags waved. The arrows' destruction was often enough to rout an opponent, and the lancers were only needed to assist chase down and sweep up the survivors. The Mongols left a breach in their ranks at the Battle of Mohi, enticing the Hungarians into withdrawing through it. The Hungarians were then dispersed across the countryside, making them easy pickings for mounted archers who rode along and picked them off while the lancers stabbed them as they fled.

Mongol forces repeatedly practised riding, archery, unit tactics, formations, and rotations. A strict, but not excessively severe or unfair, discipline was used to sustain this training. Officers and soldiers alike were typically allowed a lot of flexibility in carrying out their instructions by their superiors, as long as the plan's greater goals were met and the orders were followed swiftly. As a result, the Mongols avoided the problems of too strict discipline and micromanagement, which have hampered armies throughout history. All members, however, were required to be unconditionally devoted to one another, their superiors, and, most importantly, the Khan. If a soldier flees danger in combat, he and his nine companions from the same arban will be executed as a group.

Six out of ten Mongol troops were light cavalry horse archers, while the other four were heavier armoured and equipped lancers. Compared to modern standards, Mongol light cavalry were exceptionally light soldiers, allowing them to carry out tactics and manoeuvres that would have been impossible for a larger foe (European knights). After the archers had dispersed the enemy, the remaining forces were mostly heavy cavalry with lances for close battle. Soldiers commonly carried scimitars or halberds.

The Mongols defended their horses with lamellar armour in the same way that they protected themselves. Horse armour was separated into five sections and was meant to cover every part of the horse, including the horse's forehead, which was protected by a specially made plate fastened on either side of the horse's neck. A warrior's herd provided him with staple foods such as milk and meat, as well as hide for bowstrings, shoes, and armour, dried dung for firewood, hair for rope, battle standards, musical instruments, and helmet decorations, milk for shamanistic ceremonies to ensure victory, and hunting and entertainment that often served as military training. If he died in combat, he was occasionally accompanied by a horse, which served as a mount for the afterlife. All of the horses wore stirrups. The Mongol archers could swivel their upper bodies and fire in all directions, including backwards, because of this technological edge. Mongol soldiers would release an arrow at the same instant that a galloping horse's four hooves were off the ground, assuring a stable, well-pointed shot. Each soldier had two to four horses, so they could switch to another if one became tired. This made them one of the world's quickest armies, but it also left them vulnerable to feed shortages. Campaigning in dry locations like Central Asia or wooded areas like Southern China was tough, and even in excellent steppe terrain, a Mongol force had to move to keep its huge horse herd fed constantly.

Supply

Mongol armies were small and could survive primarily off the land. Fish hooks and other tools were included in their gear, allowing each fighter to be self-sufficient in terms of supplies. The Mongols' favourite trip meal was dried and ground beef borts, which are still popular in Mongolian cuisine today. Borts are light and portable and may be prepared in the same way as a contemporary "instant soup" using water. Each trooper generally had three or four mounts to guarantee they constantly had fresh horses. Mongolians treat horses similarly to cows, milking and slaughtering them for meat. Because most of the Mongols' mounts were mares, they could survive on their horses' milk or milk products while they travelled into enemy countries. The Mongol warrior could swallow some of the blood from his string of remounts if he were in a pinch. They could live for a month if they drank mare's milk and mare's blood. Heavy equipment was brought up by supply trains that were well-organised. Wagons and carts carried enormous caches of arrows, among other things. Finding sufficient food and water for their animals were the major logistical stumbling block to their progress. In addition, the arid terrain of Syria and the Levant makes it tough for large Mongol militaries to penetrate the region, especially given the Mamluks' scorched earth policy of burning grazing lands throughout the region. This would cause serious difficulties during some Mongol campaigns, such as their conflicts with the Mamluks. It also hampered the Mongols' ability to profit from their victory at the Battle of Mohi. Even the Great Hungarian Plain could not offer permanent grazing for all of Subutai's army's flocks and cattle.

Communications

For the rapid transmission of written communications, the Mongols created a system of postal-relay horse stations known as rtöö. Since the Roman Empire, the Mongol postal system was the first empire-wide service. Mongol battlefield communication also relied on signal flags and horns and signal arrows to a lesser extent to transmit movement instructions during battle.

The Mongol fighting man's basic armour consisted of a thick coat with a leather belt around the waist. His sword, dagger, and maybe an axe would be hung on his belt. This robe-like garment would be doubled over, the left breast over the right, and fastened with a button a small inches below the right armpit. Fur was used to line the coat. A shirt like undergarment with long, wide sleeves was often worn beneath the coat. Silk and gold threads were becoming more popular. The Mongols used thick silk undershirts for protection. Even if an arrow stabbed their leather outer clothing, the silk of their undershirt stretched to wrap itself about the arrow as it entered the flesh, minimising arrow shaft damage and making arrow removal easier. The boots were constructed of felt and leather, and while they were heavy, they were comfortable and broad enough to accept tucked-in pants before being laced firmly. They did not have heels, but the soles were substantial and fur-lined. The feet were unlikely to become cold because they were wearing felt socks. Over the heavy garment, lamellar armour was worn. The cuirass was formed of tiny scales of iron, chain mail, or hard leather stitched together using leather tongs and weighed up to 10 kilograms (22 lb) if made of leather alone and up to more if made of metal scales. The leather was first softened by boiling, then covered in a pitch-based crude lacquer to make it waterproof. Metal plates were sometimes used to strengthen the soldier's thick coat. Cone-shaped helmets with iron or steel plates of various diameters and iron-plated neck guards were worn. The Mongol hat had a conical form and was constructed of quilted cloth with a big turned-up brim, earmuffs and was reversible in the winter. His position and money determined the choice of leather or metal for a soldier's helmet.

Mounted archers demonstrate a vital role in the Mongol Empire's forces, as seen by the 13th-century Battle of Liegnitz. A force of 20,000 horse archers had beaten a force of 30,000 warriors headed by Henry II, Duke of Silesia, via demoralisation and harassment.

Mongol Bow

The Mongol armies' primary weapon was composite bows composed of laminated horn, wood, and sinew. The horn layer is inside because it resists compression, while the sinew layer is outside because it resists tension. For almost two millennia, such bows had been the primary weapon of steppe herders and warriors, with slight modifications; Mongols (and many of its subject peoples) were very adept with them. Some people claimed to be able to strike a flying bird. A strong and somewhat efficient bow may be made small enough to be used readily from horseback using composite construction. Quivers holding sixty arrows were fastened to the backs and horses of their cavalrymen. Mongol archers usually carried two to three bows (one heavier for dismounted usage, the other lighter for horseback use), as well as several quivers and files for honing their arrowheads. These arrowheads were hardened by immersing them in salt water after being heated to red-hot temperatures. The Mongols were capable of shooting an arrow over 200 meters (660 ft). At a range of 150 or 175 meters (492 or 574 feet), targeted shots were achievable, determining the ideal tactical approach distance for light cavalry troops. Ballistic rounds could impact enemy units up to 400 meters (1,300 feet) away (without targeting individual soldiers), which was effective for startling and frightening men and horses before the main attack. If the arrow is released during the period of the gallop when all four of the horse's feet are off the ground, shooting from the back of a galloping horse may be more precise. The Mongols may have employed crossbows (perhaps obtained from the Chinese) for infantry and cavalry, but they were rarely seen or utilised in battle. During the Qing Dynasty, the Manchus prohibited their Mongol people from archery, and the Mongolian bowmaking heritage was lost. The current bowmaking tradition began after the country's independence in 1921 and is based on Manchu bow types, distinct from the Mongol empire's bows. Mounted archery had gone out of favour and was only resurrected in the twenty-first century.

Sword

Due to their design and manufacture, Mongol swords were slightly curved Turko-Mongol sabres employed for slashing assaults but could also cut and thrust. This made it simpler to use while riding a horse. In addition, warriors may hold the blade in either one or two hands. It had a blade that was about 2.5 feet (0.76 m) long, with an overall length of around 1 meter (3 ft 3 in).

Jin Dynasty

The first organised Mongol invasion of Jin took place in 1211, but it took till 1234 to complete the conquest. In 1232, the Mongols attacked the Jin city of Kaifeng, using gunpowder weaponry and more traditional siege tactics, including erecting fences, watchtowers, trenches, and guardhouses and forcing Chinese captives to transport supplies and fill moats. "The battle against the city walls got increasingly violent, and bombs poured down as [the enemy] approached," writes Jin historian Liu Qi in his book. The Jin defenders also used gunpowder bombs and fire arrows launched by an early solid-propellant rocket. Liu Qi says, "Of the explosives, "The defenders retaliated with a gunpowder bomb known as the heaven-shaking-thunder bomb from within the walls. Whenever the [Mongol] soldiers came across one, numerous men would be reduced to ash at the same moment." The History of Jin contains a more fact-based and detailed account of the bomb: "The heaven-shaking-thunder-bomb is a gunpowder-filled iron vessel. It goes off like a thunderclap that can be heard for a hundred li [thirty miles], scorching an area of land more than half a mu (a mu is a sixth of an acre), and the flames may even penetrate iron armour when lit with fire and blasted off." Three centuries later, in the Xi'an area, a Ming official called He Mengchuan would come upon an ancient cache of these bombs: "When I visited Shaanxi Province on official business, I noticed an old stockpile of iron bombs on top of Xi'an's city walls. They were known as 'heaven-shaking-thunder' bombs, and they looked like an enclosed rice bowl with a hole at the top just wide enough for your finger to fit. The soldiers claimed they had not been used in a long time."

In addition, he said, "When the powder explodes, the bomb bursts open, scattering iron fragments in all directions. That is how it can kill humans and animals from a great distance." Before the siege in 1231, heaven-shaking-thunder bombs, also called thunder crash bombs, were used by a Jin general to destroy a Mongol vessel, but the Mongols retaliated by erecting complex screens of thick cowhide to defend themselves. Workers could approach so close to the walls that they could weaken their foundations and excavate defensive niches. The Jin defenders reacted by connecting iron ropes to heaven-shaking-thunder bombs and lowering them down the walls until they reached the miners' working area. The excavators were killed when the explosion pierced the protective leather screens. Jin also used a flying fire lance, which was a better form of fire lance. "To create the lance, stuff it with willow charcoal, iron bits, magnet ends, sulfur, white arsenic [possibly a mistake that should read saltpetre], and other substances, then add a fuse to the end," according to the History of Jin. When it is time to fight, the flames shoot out the front of the lance more than ten feet, and the tube is not destroyed when the gunpowder is depleted." Each troop has a small iron pot hanging on him to keep fire [probably hot coals], and when it is time to fight, the flames shoot out the front of the lance more than 10 feet, and when the gunpowder is depleted, the tube is not destroyed." While most Mongol troops despised Jin weaponry, it appears that the flying fire lance and heaven-shaking-thunder bomb were particularly dreaded. The city of Kaifeng held out for a year before the Jin emperor fled and the city surrendered. In other situations, Jin forces were successful, like when a Jin commander led 450 fire lancers against a Mongol encampment, which was "totally routed, and three thousand five hundred were drowned." Even after the Jin emperor declined in 1234, a loyalist accumulated all the metal he could find in the city he was defending, including gold and silver, and built explosives to throw at the Mongols. Still, the Mongol Empire's momentum was unstoppable. Both the Western Xia and Jin dynasties had been conquered by 1234.

Song Dynasty

The Mongol war machine marched south and assaulted the Song city of Anfeng (modern Shouxian, Anhui Province) in 1237, "burning the [defensive] towers with gunpowder bombs [huo pao]." "Several hundred guys launched one bomb, and if it struck the tower, it would quickly break it to pieces," according to the report. The Song defenders, headed by Du Gao, repaired the towers and replied with their explosives, dubbed the "Elipao" after a famed local pear, most likely due to the weapon's form. The narrative of this fight also states that the Anfeng defenders were supplied with a sort of tiny arrow that could shoot through the eye holes of Mongol armour since conventional arrows were too thick to pass through. Gunpowder weaponry had become crucial to the Song war effort by the mid-13th century. In 1257, Song official Li Zengbo was despatched to survey the arsenals of border cities. An ideal city arsenal, according to Li, would comprise several hundred thousand iron bombshells, as well as a production plant capable of producing at least a few thousand each month. His border trip yielded dismal results, as he discovered a weapon in one armoury "There are no more than 85 huge and tiny iron bombshells, 95 fire-arrows, and 105 fire-lances available. This is insufficient for a hundred soldiers, let alone a thousand, to defend against a barbarian invasion. The government allegedly intends to prepare to defend its fortified cities and provide them with military supplies in an attack. What a frightening lack of interest!" Fortunately for the Song, Möngke Khan had died in 1259, and the war did not resume until 1269, when it did, under the command of Kublai Khan, although the Mongols had arrived in force by then.

The twin fortified city of Xiangyang and Fancheng blocked the Mongols' route south of the Yangtze. The outcome was one of the world's longest sieges, lasting from 1268 until 1273. The Song defenders had been able to obtain supplies and reinforcements by sea during the first three years, but in 1271, the Mongols established a full blockade with their powerful fleet, isolating the two towns. However, this did not stop Song from running the supply line first, and two men named Zhang did just that. The Two Zhangs commanded a hundred paddlewheel boats and travelled at night under the light of lanterns, but a Mongol commander spotted them early on.

When the Song fleet approached the cities, they discovered the Mongol fleet had stretched itself across the Yangtze's full width, with "vessels fanned out, spanning the entire surface of the river, and there was no space for them to enter." Another defensive precaution used by the Mongols was the building of a chain that spanned the river. The Song began to fire with fire-lances, firebombs, and crossbows as the two fleets clashed in combat. Many soldiers perished trying to cut through shackles, pull up stakes, and throw explosives, while Song marines battled hand to hand with huge axes, and "on their ships, they were up to the ankles in blood," according to the Mongol account. The Song boats arrived at the city gates with the morning, and the populace "leapt up a hundred times in glee." Two Muslim engineers, one from Persia and the other from Syria, assisted the Mongols in developing counterweight trebuchets in 1273. These new siege weapons could fire bigger missiles further than traction trebuchets could. "When the mechanism went off, the roar rocked heaven and earth; everything that [the missile] touched was smashed and destroyed," according to one account. In 1273, the fortified city of Xiangyang fell. The next significant fight to use gunpowder weaponry took place during a war conducted by Mongol general Bayan, who commanded an army of about two hundred thousand troops, the majority of whom were Chinese. It was most likely the Mongols' greatest army in history. As demonstrated in the 1274 Siege of Shayang, such an army could still not effectively storm Song city walls. As a result, Bayan waited for the wind to shift to the north before ordering his artillerists to begin shelling the city with molten metal bombs, causing such a conflagration that "the buildings were burned up as well as the smoke and flames soared up to heaven." Shayang was seized, and the people who lived there were murdered. In the later phases of the Mongol-Song Wars, gunpowder bombs were utilised again in the 1275 Siege of Changzhou. When Bayan arrived in the city, he issued a request to the residents: "If you oppose us, we will drain your corpses of blood and use them as cushions." This did not work, and the city fought nevertheless. Hence, the Mongol army blasted them with firebombs before assaulting the walls, resulting in a massive bloodbath that killed a quarter of a million people. The battle continued barely four years longer, during which time some remnants of the Song put up last-ditch fortifications.

When it became obvious that defeat was impending in 1277, 250 defenders led by Lou Qianxia carried out a suicide bombing and detonated a massive iron bomb. According to the History of Song, "The sound was like a huge thunderclap, shaking the walls and the earth, while smoke filled the sky outside. Outside, a large number of troops were scared to death. They went in to see what had happened once the fire had been put out. There were only ashes left, no sign of what had happened." Thus, the Mongol-Song Wars came to a conclusion with the deployment of all gunpowder weapons accessible to either side at the time, which for the top part included gunpowder arrows, bombs, and lances. Still, in retrospect, another development, the advent of the cannon, would eclipse them all. A huge store of gunpowder at Weiyang in Yangzhou accidentally caught fire in 1280, resulting in such a massive explosion that a week later, a team of inspectors at the site deduced that over 100 guards had been killed instantly, with wooden beams and pillars blown sky high and landing at a distance of over ten li (two miles or three kilometres) from the explosion which created a crater more than ten feet deep.

One neighbour described the boom of the explosion as "as if it were a bomb going off." "It seemed like a volcano erupted, and a wave slammed towards the shore. The public as a whole was scared." According to survivors, the event was caused by novice gunpowder manufacturers recruited to replace the previous ones and was negligent when grinding sulfur. A spark from the grinding process collided with some fire lances, causing them to erupt in flames and scurry around "like scared snakes." The gunpowder manufacturers did nothing because the sight amused them, that is, until one of the fire lances exploded in a stockpile of explosives, causing the entire complex to erupt. The veracity of this claim is debatable, presuming that everyone in the local area was murdered.

The explosive potential of gunpowder had been perfected by the time of Jiao Yu and his Huolongjing (a book that describes military applications of gunpowder in great detail) in the mid 14th century, as the level of nitrate in gunpowder formulas had risen from a range of 12 per cent to 91 per cent, with at least six different formulas in use that are considered to have the maximum explosive potential for gunpowder. By that time, the Chinese had figured out how to make explosive round shot by putting nitrate-enhanced gunpowder inside hollow shells.

Europe and Japan

During the Mongol invasions of Europe, gunpowder may have been employed. Some accounts mention "fire catapults," "pao," and "naphtha-shooters." "There is no clear evidence that the Mongols utilised gunpowder weaponry regularly outside of China," Timothy May says. The Japanese made a scroll picture portraying a bomb shortly after the Mongol invasions of Japan (1274–1281). The bomb, known in Japanese as tetsuhau, is thought to have been a Chinese thunder crash bomb. According to Japanese accounts of the invasions, iron and bamboo pao caused "light and fire" and emitted 2–3,000 iron bullets.

Hand Cannon

The earliest appearance of the hand cannon is often attributed to the late 13th century, just after the Mongols conquered the Song dynasty. However, Robin Yates uncovered a sculpture showing a man carrying a gourd-shaped hand cannon among the Dazu Rock Carvings in 1985. After the Jin dynasty took control of Kaifeng in 1128, the statues were completed around 250 kilometres northwest of Chongqing. If the date is true, the cannon's arrival in China would be pushed back by a hundred years more than previously assumed. The cannon's bulbous shape is similar to the first-hand cannons unearthed in China and Europe.

Archaeological evidence of the gun, especially the hand cannon (huochong), dates back to the 13th century. The Xanadu Gun, named because it was discovered in the ruins of Xanadu, the Mongol summer palace in Inner Mongolia, is the earliest surviving gun with an exact date. The Xanadu Gun is 34.7 cm long and 6.2 kg in weight. Its age is determined by archaeological evidence and a simple inscription whose era name and year match the year 1298 on the Gregorian calendar. The inscription not only provides the era name and year, but it also includes a serial number and manufacture details, implying that gun production had already become systematised, or at least standardised, by the time it was made. Some think that the gun's design contains axial holes in the back that might have been utilised in a mounting mechanism. It is tiny, weighing slightly over six kilos and measuring 35 cm in length, like other early firearms with the probable exception of the Western Xia cannon.

Although the Xanadu Gun is the most accurately dated gun from the 13th century, other existing examples with estimated dates may predate it. The Heilongjiang hand cannon, found in 1970 and named after the region of Heilongjiang in northeastern China, is one contender. Like the Xanadu gun, it is tiny and light, weighing just 3.5 kilos and measuring 34 cm (Needham claims 35 cm) with a barrel of around 2.5 cm. Historians think Yuan soldiers employed it against a Mongol prince Nayan revolt in 1287, based on contextual evidence. According to Yuan's History, Li Ting, a Jurchen leader, led men armed with hand cannons into combat against Nayan. The Ningxia gun, which is much older, was discovered by collector Meng Jianmin in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. This Yuan period handgun measures 34.6 cm in length, with a muzzle diameter of 2.6 cm, and weighs 1.55 kg. It has the same serial number as the Xanadu Gun, indicating that it may have been part of a larger production run. While the period name and date correlate to 1271 CE on the Gregorian Calendar, making it older than both the Heilongjiang Hand Gun and the Xanadu Gun, one of the era names is unusual, casting uncertainty the actual date of creation among academics.

The Wuwei Bronze Cannon, discovered in a cellar in Wuwei, Gansu Province in 1980, maybe the oldest and largest cannon of the 13th century: a 100 centimetre 108-kilogram bronze cannon discovered in a cellar in Wuwei, Gansu Province, with no inscription, but historians have dated it to the late Western Xia term in between 1214 and 1227. When discovered, the gun had an iron ball with a diameter of nine centimetres, smaller than the muzzle diameter of twelve centimetres, and 0.1 kilos of gunpowder, implying that the projectile was another co-viative. Before its extremely corroded form at the time of discovery, Ben Sinvany and Dang Shoushan believe the ball was much bigger. Despite its size, the weapon is notably cruder and irregularly cast than subsequent Yuan period firearms. In 1997, a weapon identical to this one was discovered not far from the discovery location, although it was considerably smaller, weighing just 1.5 kg. However, Chen Bingying contends that there were no firearms before 1259, while Dang Shoushan believes the Western Xia guns testify to the introduction of guns by 1220, and Stephen Haw claims that guns were produced as early as 1200. The introduction of the "real" cannon is more conservatively estimated to have occurred about 1280 by sinologist Joseph Needham and renaissance siege specialist Thomas Arnold. Regardless of whether these theories are accurate, the gun appears to have been invented somewhere in the 13th century.

Catapults and Machines

One of the essential aspects of Mongolian combat was technology. For example, siege machines played a crucial role in Genghis Khan's military, particularly when attacking walled cities. The siege engines were not dismantled and transported by horses to the battleground to be rebuilt, as was customary with European forces. Instead, the Mongol army would be accompanied by experienced engineers who would construct siege engines from scratch using local resources. Engineers for the devices were recruited from among the captives, most of whom were from China and Persia, and were headed by a Han commander named Guo Kan. When the Mongols killed the entire villages that resisted or refused to surrender, the engineers and other groups were frequently spared and quickly assimilated into the Mongol forces.

During a siege of a walled Chinese city, the defenders removed all large rocks from the area to deny the Mongols ammunition for their trebuchets. Still, the Mongol engineers resorted to chopping up logs soaked in water to form appropriately big spheres. During the siege of the Assassins' bastion of Alamut, the Mongols gathered big boulders from all over, stacking them up in depots a day's trip apart from to their siege lines, ensuring that the breaching batteries working against the great citadel had a plentiful supply. The Mongols also searched the city's slopes for appropriate higher ground to erect ballistas operated by northern Chinese engineers, allowing them to snipe into the fortress's interior. During his Khwarezmian campaign, Genghis Khan used Chinese engineers and traction trebuchets gained from victories against the Jurchens and Tanguts. At the same time, Kublai Khan called upon Muslim engineers from his Ilkhanate cousins to build counterweight trebuchets that finally ended the siege.

The usage of the kharash was a popular Mongol strategy. The Mongols would amass captured prisoners from past wars and use them to advance in sieges and battles. These "shields" would frequently absorb the brunt of enemy arrows and crossbow bolts, shielding the Mongol soldiers somehow. In addition, the kharash were often deployed by commanders as assault forces to break down fortifications.

In the maelstrom of war, Mongol battlefield tactics combined excellent training, outstanding communication, and discipline. They prepared for almost every scenario so that they could react properly if it occurred. The Mongols also did a good job of protecting their high-ranking officers. Their discipline and training allowed them to battle without the need for continual monitoring or rallying, putting commanders in difficult situations. Mongol commanders sought the highest terrain available whenever feasible to make tactical judgments based on the greatest perspective of the battlefield as it developed. Furthermore, being on the high ground allowed their soldiers to see flag-transmitted instructions than if the land was level more easily. Keeping the senior command on the high ground also made it simpler to fight against surprise attacks and invasions.

Intelligence and Planning

Before every attack, the Mongols meticulously scouted and spied on their adversaries. For example, before the invasion of Europe, Batu and Subutai dispatched spies into the heart of Europe for over ten years, mapping out ancient Roman highways, creating trade lines, and assessing each principality's capacity to withstand the invasion. They made educated predictions about each principality's readiness to assist the others, as well as their capacity to resist alone or in concert. In addition, while conquering a territory, the Mongols would go to any extent to take the towns and cities. For example, diverting rivers away from the city/town, cutting off supplies to the city and waiting for its residents to surrender, gathering civilians from nearby zones to fill the front line for the town attack before scaling the wall, pillaging the surrounding area and killing some of the people, then allowing some survivors to flee to the main city to report their losses to the maid.

Psychological Warfare and Deception

In several of their conflicts, the Mongols employed psychological warfare to great effect, especially when it came to spreading panic and fear throughout villages and cities. They frequently gave the adversary the option of surrendering and paying tribute rather than having their city ravaged and destroyed. They understood that sedentary communities did not have the same freedom to leave danger as nomads and that the destruction of their towns was the biggest loss a stationary population could suffer. Cities that accepted the offer were spared, but they were obliged to provide troops, supplies, and other services to the conquering Mongol army. If the offer is turned down, the Mongols will assault the city or town and destroy it, although they will allow a few inhabitants to leave and spread panic by publicising their loss. These stories were crucial in instilling dread in others. However, both sides had an incentive in exaggerating the magnitude of recorded events, albeit for opposite reasons: the Mongols' image would improve, while the townsfolk might exploit their stories of fear to organise an army. As a result, detailed statistics (such as casualty figures) provided in contemporary sources must be carefully examined.

In their conflicts, the Mongols also excelled at deceit. When approaching a mobile army, for example, the forces might be divided into three or more army groups, each attempting to outflank and surprise their adversaries. This generated several battlefield scenarios for the opponents in which the Mongols appeared out of nowhere and appeared to be far more numerous than they were. Flanking and feigning withdrawal if the adversary could not be dealt with was a common tactic. Other Mongol tactics included showing up from a hill or other predetermined location, then disappearing into the woods or behind hills. At the same time, the Mongols' flank troops, who were already strategically positioned, appeared out of nowhere from the right, left, and rear. Throughout the early periods of the battle, they would fake numerical superiority by instructing each soldier to light at least five fires, giving opposing scouts and spies that their force was nearly five times bigger than it was. Binding tree branches or leaves behind their horses was another method the Mongols utilised deception and fear. They pulled the leaves behind them systematically to generate dust storms behind hills, fooling the enemy into thinking they were a much bigger assaulting force and compelling them to surrender. Finally, because each Mongol soldier possessed many horses, they would let captives and townspeople ride them quickly before a battle to increase their numbers.

Inclusion

When the Mongols conquered new peoples, they incorporated the captured people's troops into their armies, whether they had surrendered voluntarily or not. As a result, their army numbers grew as they moved into new territories and conquered new populations. The Battle of Baghdad, in which many different people battled under Mongol rule, is an example of this. Nevertheless, despite this assimilation, the Mongols were never able to win the loyalty of the peoples they conquered on a long-term basis.

The tumens would usually march in five lines across a broad front. Horse archers would make up the first three lines, while lancers would make up the final two. The Mongols would strive to avoid dangerous or reckless frontal attacks after they had found an opposing army. Instead, they would deploy diversionary attacks to pin the enemy down while their main troops tried to outflank or encircle the opponent. The horse archers would begin by firing a barrage of arrows. Camels carrying more arrows followed close behind, guaranteeing a steady supply of ammo.

Flanking

Reliant on the requirements, the troops, would be split into distinct formations of 10, 100, 1,000, or 10,000 in all battlefield circumstances. If a considerable number of troops were separated from the main force, say 10,000 or more, they would be handed over to a major or second-in-command leader, leaving the main commander to focus on the front lines. The Mongol leader would usually prescribe the strategies for attacking the adversary. When the leader sees a city or town, for example, he may order "500 to the left and 500 to the right"; these instructions would then be transmitted to the appropriate five units of 100 troops, who would attempt to flank or encircle the town to the left and right.

Encirclement and Opening

These tactics aimed to surround the city, cutting off escape routes and overwhelming the city from all sides. If one of the fronts or flanks deteriorated, the hill commander commanded one army section to assist the other. After studying the opponents' tactics and defences in the first fight, the Mongols would retire to preserve their men and attack the following day, or the next month, after studying the enemies' tactics and defences, or issue a demand for surrender after causing some damage. There was no set schedule for when or where units should be deployed; it was entirely dependent on battle conditions, and flanks and groups had complete autonomy over what they did during the battle - such as supporting other flanks or performing individual feigned retreats as conditions dictated, in small groups of hundred (100) to thousand (1000) - as long as the battle unfolded according to the general directive.

Feigned Retreat

The feigned retreat was a popular Mongol tactic, and it was arguably the most difficult to perform on the battlefield. This is because if an adversary rushes into simulated disarray among unskilled forces, it may quickly degenerate into a genuine rout. The Mongols would seem terrified and turn and flee during combat, pretending to be in confusion and defeat, only to pivot when the opponent was drawn out and slaughter them at their leisure. As the enemy became more aware of the Mongols' strategy, they would stretch their phoney retreats for days or weeks to fool the chasers into thinking they were beaten, only to chargeback once the opponent's guard was down or withdrawn rejoin the main formation.