The Empire of Japan, led by Prime Minister Kuma Shigenobu, submitted the Twenty-One Demands to the administration of the Republic of China on 18 January 1915, during World War I. Japan's dominance of China would be considerably expanded as a result of the secret demands. It would preserve the former German territories it had captured when World War I began in 1914. Manchuria and South Mongolia would be strongholds. In railways, it would play a more significant role. The most extreme requirements (in section 5) would give Japan a decisive role in money, law enforcement, and government issues. The final element would effectively turn China into a protectorate of Japan, reducing Western influence. As the Western nations were locked in a stalemate with Germany, Japan was in a strong position. Since 1902, Britain and Japan have had a military alliance, and London had asked Tokyo to join the war in 1914. Beijing made the secret demands public and appealed to Washington and London. They were sympathetic, and Tokyo was obliged to abandon section 5. Japan gave up its sixth set of requirements in the final settlement of 1916. It gained a bit in China but lost a lot of respect and trust in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The Chinese population retaliated with a statewide boycott of Japanese goods, causing Japan's exports to China to plummet. Britain was offended, and it lost faith in Japan as an ally. Although Japan's position was strong and Britain's was weak as the First World War began, Britain and the United States persuaded Japan to withdraw the fifth set of demands, which would have given Japan significant influence over the whole Chinese economy and put an end to the Open Door Policy. On 25 May 1915, Japan and China established a series of agreements that recognized the first four sets of goals.
Over its victories in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had established a large range of effect in northern China and Manchuria and had thus united the ranks of the European imperialistic controls in their scramble to develop political and economic dominance over Imperial China under the Qing dynasty. With the Xinhai Revolution overthrowing the Qing dynasty and the foundation of the new Republic of China, Japan saw an opportunity to strengthen its position in China. Since 1898, the German Empire has ruled Shandong province as part of the Kiautschou Bay concession. On the outbreak of World War I, Japan declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914. Following the Siege of Tsingtao, Japanese and British forces soon conquered all German holdings in the Far East.
Japan developed the initial list of Twenty-One Demands under Prime Minister Kuma Shigenobu and Foreign Minister Kat Takaaki. It was examined by the genr and Emperor Taish and approved by the Diet. On 18 January 1915, diplomat Hioki Eki submitted this list to President Yuan Shikai of the Beiyang administration in a private session, threatening terrible consequences if China rejected them. The twenty-one demands were broken down into five categories:
Japan attempted to keep the contents of "Group 5" a secret at first, knowing the harsh reaction it would elicit. However, the Chinese government tried to prolong the process by leaking the complete text of the Twenty-One Demands to European nations in the hopes that they would assist in containing Japan due to a perceived danger to their own political and economic interests.
After China refused Japan's amended proposal on 26 April 1915, the genr intervened and removed 'Group 5' from the document since the Chinese government had found it most disagreeable. On 7 May, a condensed version of the "Thirteen Demands" was delivered in the form of an injunction, with a two-day response deadline. Yuan Shikai, who was contending with other local warlords for the title of Emperor of China, was unable to risk war with Japan and instead chose appeasement, a strategy that his successors adopted. Both parties signed the treaty in its complete form on 25 May 1915. Yuan urged Kat Takaaki to issue the request to salvage face with the Chinese people by agreeing to the Demands. According to American Minister Paul Reinsch, the Chinese were shocked by the leniency of the injunction, who told the US State Department that it requested far less than they had already agreed to relinquish.
The amended final (Thirteen Requirements) version of the Twenty-One Demands had significantly more harmful than good results for Japan. The new deal offered Japan little more than it already had in China without "Group 5". On the other hand the United States, had responded angrily to Japan's rejection of the Open Door Policy. While acknowledging Japan's particular interests in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Shandong, the United States expressed alarm over future encroachments on Chinese sovereignty in the Bryan Note released by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on 13 March 1915.
Japan's closest ally, the United Kingdom, expressed alarm about what is seen as Japan's overbearing, bullying diplomacy, and the British Foreign Office, in particular, was dissatisfied with Japanese aspirations to establish what would effectively be a Japanese protectorate over all of China. Following that, Japan and the United States sought a compromise, and the Lansing–Ishii Agreement was signed in 1917. Finally, in 1919, the Paris Peace Conference has adopted.
The overall political impact of Japan's operations in China was highly unfavorable, causing widespread public resentment of Japan, contributing to the 4 May Movement, and a considerable rise in nationalism. Despite the Chinese delegation's rejection to sign the treaty, Japan continued to seek complete control of Shandong Province and received European diplomatic approval for their claim at the Treaty of Versailles. This, in turn, sparked resentment from the US administration and widespread antagonism in China, with a large-scale boycott of Japanese goods being one of the consequences. The United States engineered a deal in 1922 that gave China nominal sovereignty over all of Shandong while maintaining Japan's economic supremacy in practice.