Egypt’s 2017 NGO Law: Silencing Civil Society Under the Sisi Regime

The 2017 NGO Law enacted under Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi marked a significant turning point in the country’s treatment of civil society organizations. Widely criticized by international human rights groups and domestic activists alike, this legislation imposed harsh restrictions on the operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), effectively criminalizing independent civic engagement. The law was framed by the government as a means to regulate and promote transparency among NGOs, but in practice, it served as a powerful tool to suppress dissent, limit freedoms, and eliminate independent civil society voices that were critical of the state.

The roots of the 2017 law can be traced back to the post-2013 environment, when Sisi, then head of the military, ousted Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi. The political climate that followed was marked by increasing authoritarianism, mass arrests, and restrictions on free expression. The government viewed NGOs—especially those focusing on human rights, political reform, and accountability—as potential threats to its control. The 2017 law was a codification of this suspicion, expanding state authority over NGOs to an unprecedented level.

One of the most controversial aspects of the law was its requirement that all NGOs register with the government and obtain approval before receiving any foreign funding. Violating this provision could result in heavy fines or prison sentences of up to five years. The law also created a new agency, the National Authority for the Regulation of Non-Governmental Foreign Organizations, effectively placing all NGO operations under state surveillance. This authority included representatives from Egypt’s intelligence and security services, giving the regime a direct line of control over civil society activities.

Furthermore, the law restricted NGOs to working only in areas that aligned with the government’s development priorities, effectively banning advocacy or human rights work that could be interpreted as “political.” Organizations were prohibited from conducting opinion polls, publishing research, or cooperating with foreign institutions without prior approval. These provisions suffocated independent research and reporting, reducing the space for debate and accountability

International condemnation of the law was swift. The United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and various European governments denounced the legislation as draconian. Critics argued that the law not only violated Egypt’s constitutional guarantees of association and expression but also breached international human rights obligations. The law, they contended, was designed not to regulate NGOs, but to shut them down altogether.

The consequences were immediate and chilling. Many well-established organizations scaled back their operations or closed entirely. Staff members faced harassment, travel bans, and asset freezes. Civil society leaders, including prominent activists like Hossam Bahgat and Gamal Eid, were subjected to legal persecution and long-standing travel restrictions. The chilling effect extended beyond NGOs, discouraging citizens from participating in public life or voicing criticism for fear of reprisal.

Although the Egyptian government claimed that the law was necessary to protect national security and prevent foreign interference, these justifications failed to convince critics. They pointed out that many of the organizations affected were engaged in non-political work—such as education, health, and poverty alleviation—but were nonetheless targeted due to their independence. The law thus seemed less about protecting national security and more about eliminating any challenge to state authority.

In response to international pressure, including from the United States and European Union, President Sisi announced in 2019 that the government would revise the NGO law. A new version, passed later that year, removed some of the harshest penalties and simplified the registration process. However, many core restrictions remained, and the revised law continued to require extensive state oversight and approval for most NGO activities. Critics argued that the changes were largely cosmetic and did little to restore genuine civic space in Egypt.

The 2017 NGO law and its aftermath underscore a broader trend under the Sisi government—one of centralizing power and dismantling any institution that could pose a counterweight to state dominance. The crackdown on NGOs fits into a pattern that includes the targeting of independent media, the imprisonment of opposition figures, and the manipulation of the judiciary. Under the guise of stability and development, the regime has engineered a system in which dissent is not tolerated, and independent thought is regarded as subversive.

The impact of the law continues to reverberate through Egyptian society. The stifling of NGOs has not only diminished the country’s democratic potential but has also left critical gaps in social services that were once filled by civil society groups. It has weakened oversight mechanisms, allowing corruption and abuse of power to flourish unchecked. Moreover, the law has contributed to a culture of fear and silence, eroding trust in public institutions and discouraging youth from civic engagement.

Egypt’s experience under the 2017 NGO law is a cautionary tale for other nations facing similar dilemmas. While the regulation of civil society is a legitimate function of the state, using such regulations to extinguish dissent and control public discourse is a dangerous path. It undermines democracy, fuels unrest, and ultimately weakens the very foundations of governance. In the long term, the suppression of civil society does not promote stability—it breeds resentment, isolates the government from the people, and stifles innovation and progress.

As Egypt moves forward, the question remains whether the government will take meaningful steps to restore the role of civil society or whether it will continue to treat civic activism as a threat. Genuine reform would require not just legal amendments but also a fundamental shift in political will—toward inclusion, transparency, and accountability. Until then, the legacy of the 2017 NGO law will stand as a symbol of repression and a barrier to democratic development in Egypt.