Ottoman Tunisia: a Three-Century Period of Turkish Presence in Ifriqiya

Ottoman Tunis, or Ottoman Tunisia, is a three-century period in which the Turkish presence in Ifriqiya lasted from the 16th to the 18th centuries when Tunis was formally absorbed into the Ottoman Empire as the Eyalet Tunis (province). The Ottoman Empire began in 1516 with the capture of Algiers by the Ottoman Turkish corsair and Beylerbey Oruç Reis, eventually encompassing all of the Maghrib save Morocco. Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, the younger brother of Oruç Reis, the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Fleet during Suleiman the Magnificent's rule, led the first Ottoman invasion of Tunis in 1534. However, the old Hafsid Tunisia was not fully acquired by the Turks until the ultimate Ottoman reconquest of Tunis from Spain in 1574 by Kapudan Pasha Uluç Ali Reis, who held it until the French takeover of Tunisia in 1881. Initially, under Turkish authority from Algiers, the Ottoman Porte quickly selected an administrator named the Pasha, whom janissary soldiers backed up.

On the other hand, Tunisia quickly became an independent province under the control of the local Bey. Algiers attempted to contest this development of status on several occasions but was unsuccessful. During this time, Tunisia's ruling councils were primarily made up of foreigners who spoke Ottoman Turkish and conducted governmental business in that language. Barbary pirates attacked European ships, mainly from Algiers and Tunis and Tripoli. Still, after a lengthy period of diminishing incursions, the increasing might of European powers forced its end during the Barbary Wars. Tunisia's borders shrank under the Ottoman Empire, as it lost land to the west and east (Tripoli). Tunisia's rulers became aware of the Ottoman capital's continuing political and social reform initiatives in the 19th century. The Bey of Tunis then sought to accomplish a modernising reform of institutions and the economy, based on his judgment but informed by the Turkish model. Tunisia's foreign debt has become unmanageable. This was the justification or excuse for the establishment of a Protectorate by French soldiers in 1881. A people of Turkish descent, formerly referred to as the Kouloughlis, is a legacy of centuries of Turkish domination.

Control of the western Mediterranean was fought in the 16th century between Spaniards and Turks. Both were upbeat as a result of recent victories and growth. Spain accomplished her centuries-long reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 1492, followed by the establishment of the first Spanish colonies in America. The Spanish government responded by establishing a series of presidios along the African coast. The Ottoman Turks, for their part, had captured Constantinople in 1453, then successfully pushed farther into the Balkans (1459–1482), and eventually took Syria and Egypt (1516–1517). Then, from bases in the Maghrib, Turkish corsairs began to operate. Spain seized and conquered numerous North African ports, notably Mers-el-Kebir (1505), Oran (1509), Tripoli (1510), and Bougie (1510), and signed treaties with a half-dozen more. Agreements with Algiers (1510) involved Spanish control of the off-shore island Peón de Argel, with Tlemcen (1511), a city approximately 40 kilometres inland, and with Tunis had a long-running Spanish alliance. The port of Goletta, near Tunis, was later captured by Spanish soldiers, who erected a vast and robust presidio there and an aqueduct to Tunis for the kasbah's use. The Hafsid dynasty had controlled Tunisia since 1227, gaining grandeur when it was the Maghrib's dominant power or barely surviving in less favourable periods. Throughout the ages, there was extensive commerce with European merchants, which resulted in state treaties. The Hafsids, on the other hand, had corsairs who plundered commercial ships. Hundreds of Christians, virtually all Catalans, served as bodyguards for the Hafsids during the 15th century. The Hafsid power weakened in the 16th century and was often restricted to Tunis; the final three Hafsid sultans, al-Hasan, his son Ahmad, and his brother Muhammad, forged contradictory treaties with Spain.

Despite repeated confrontations, the cross-cultural Hafsid alliance with Spain was not as rare as it would appear, considering the numerous Muslim-Christian treaties. France joined with the Ottomans against King Carlos of Spain in the early 16th century. A few Muslim monarchs urged Turkish soldiers to invade the region to fight the Spanish presence due to Spain's Africa policy. However, the Hafsid rulers of Tunis and the Sa'dids of Morocco regarded the Turks and their corsair allies as a more significant danger and allied with Spain. Nonetheless, many Maghribi Muslims favoured Islamic authority, and the Hafsid's decades-long Spanish relationship was unpopular, if not outright anathema to some. The Moroccan sultans of the Saadi dynasty, on the other hand, were able to effectively play off Iberian against Turk, remaining both Muslim governed and independent of Ottoman control. In this naval conflict, the Ottoman Empire backed many corsairs that plundered European merchant ships in the Mediterranean. Later, the pirates would make Algiers their main base. Aruj [Oruç] (c.1474–1518) and his younger brother Khizr "Khayr al-Din" [Arabic epithet] (c.1483–1546) were the "architects of Ottoman authority in the Maghrib." Barbarossa was the name given to both of them ("red beard"). The Muslim brothers were from the Greek island of Medelli or Mytilene [ancient Lesbos], and their origins were unknown. The two brothers came to Tunis as corsair leaders after gaining battle experience in the eastern Mediterranean (during which Aruj was captured and served three years at oars in a galley of the Knights of St. John before being ransomed). By 1504, they had signed a privateer arrangement with Mohammad b. al-Hasan (1493–1526), the Hafsid ruler. It stipulated that the 'prizes' (ships, cargoes, and prisoners) be divided. The brothers operated out of Goletta [Halq al Wadi], and from Djerba in the south, where Aruj was governor, they ran similar activities. Those who remained non-Christian in Spain at this time, including Muslims, were forced to flee; at times, Aruj used his ships to convey many Moorish Andalusians to North Africa, particularly Tunisia. Aruj received acclaim and a large number of Muslim recruits as a result of his efforts. Aruj accompanied the Hafsids in two failed attacks on Bougie, which Spain controlled. The brothers then established a different foothold in Djidjelli, east of Bougie, which drew Hafsid wrath. Aruj and his brother Khayr al-Din, supported by Turkish soldiers, proceeded west to Algiers in 1516, wresting power from the Tha'aliba tribe's shaykh, who had signed a treaty with Spain. Control of Algiers went to the Barbarossa brothers through intra-city political manoeuvring in which the tribe head and later 22 notables were assassinated. The Turkish brothers had already allied with the Ottomans. Muslim tribal troops and the Spanish murdered aruj in 1518 as he led an offensive on Tlemcen, which had been held by a Spanish ally since 1511.

Khayr al-Din, his younger brother, assumed leadership of Algiers but relocated to the city's east for a while. After returning to Algiers, he seized the outlying island Peón de Argel, whose cannons had commanded the harbour from Spain in 1529. He built an ideal port for the city by constructing a causeway connecting two islands. Khayr al-Din led large-scale attacks on Christian ships and the coastlands of Mediterranean Europe, seizing vast sums of money and capturing a considerable number of people. He earned himself a celebrity after winning numerous naval engagements. Khayr al-Din was summoned to Constantinople in 1533 when the Ottoman sultan appointed him Pasha and admiral [Kapudan-i Derya] of the Turkish fleet and command of a large number of ships and troops. In 1534, Khayr al-Din arrived by sea and seized Tunis from Spain's allies, "taking advantage of a revolution against the Hafsid al-Hasan." The following year, Emperor Charles V (Carlos, Rey de España) (r.1516–1556) assembled a navy under Andrea Doria of Genoa, consisting of Italians, Germans, and Spaniards recaptured Tunis in 1535, restoring the Hafsid ruler Mawlay Hasan. Khayr al-Din, on the other hand, managed to getaway. Following that, as the Ottoman Empire's supreme commander of naval forces, Khayr al-Din was primarily engaged with matters outside the Maghrib. After a few decades, another Turkish corsair, Dragut (Turgut), ruled in Tripoli, attacked Tunisia from the east in 1556, landing at Kairouan in 1558. Then, in 1569, Uluj Ali Pasha, a renegade pirate who succeeded Khayr al-Din as the Beylerbey of Algiers, marched with Turkish soldiers from the west and seized the Spanish presidio Goletta as well as the Hafsid capital of Tunis. After the Christian armada's crucial naval victory at Lepanto in 1571, Don Juan de Austria retook Tunis for Spain in 1573, restoring Hafsid authority. Uluj Ali, however, returned in 1574 with a strong ship and army and successfully conquered Tunis. He subsequently transported the final monarch of the Hafsid dynasty, the last ruler of the Hafsid dynasty, to the Turkish sultan via ship, imprisoned. The 1581 ceasefire between Spain and the Ottoman Empire ended the Mediterranean rivalry between these two great powers. Spain retained a handful of its presidios and ports in the Maghrib (e.g., Melilla and Oran). Both the Spanish and Ottoman empires, however, had become busy with other matters. For the following three centuries, the Ottomans would claim suzerainty over Tunisia; nevertheless, their practical political power in the Maghrib would be short-lived.

The political situation favoured the Christian north if the Turks did not enter the western Mediterranean. In terms of overall strength, the major European powers, led by Spain, have continued to gain ground. In comparison, business declined in the local Maghriban states, and their governments were weak and fragmented. In the long run, it appeared that an eventual reconquest of North Africa from the north was a possibility, if not a certainty. As a result, another emerging foreign force, co-religionists from the east, notably the well-armed Ottoman Turks, looked critical. It tilted the scales in the Maghrib, allowing the older Muslim institutions to reign for several centuries, as per Turkish conceptions. Furthermore, the Ottoman Porte at Constantinople's effective but dubious technique of conducting assaults on European commercial vessels by Barbary corsairs fit well enough with the Mediterranean strategy followed by the Ottoman Porte.

"Native North African kings repeatedly attacked Turkey, and it was never able to establish a foothold in Morocco. But, on the other hand, the Turks were a formidable ally for the Barbarians, diverting Christian resources towards eastern Europe, endangering Mediterranean connections, and absorbing troops that might otherwise have focused on reconquest in Africa."

As a result, the Ottomans reached the Maghrib for the first time, eventually establishing their ruling power, at least indirectly, throughout much of the Mediterranean's southern shore. Their Empire was primarily regarded as the world's foremost Muslim power during the 16th and succeeding centuries, with Islam its primary focus. For over half a century, the Ottoman Empire was "the leader of all Islam." The caliph was the Turkish sultan. Tunisia was benefited from Ottoman interaction because of its particular Islamic culture and institutions, which stood apart from the rest of the Arab world. For more than a millennium, Islamic ideas were filtered through the Turkish experience based on Central Asian ethnicity, resulting in distinctive innovations and fresh viewpoints. Turks, for example, created their gazi sagas of frontier warfare, very certainly inspired by Islamic tales of early Arab conquests and informed by mythology originating from living on the Central Asian steppes. For centuries, the Ottoman state-led Muslim legal advancements due to leadership demands and its broad geographic jurisdiction. Imperial law was based on "the traditions of the vast Turkish and Mongol empires of Central Asia," as well as Islamic fiqh and inherited Roman-Byzantine laws. Ebu us-Suud Efendi (c.1490–1574), a Turkish jurist, is credited for harmonising the qanun (secular state norms) and the şeriat for use in Ottoman courts (sacred law). In addition, the Turkish language was used to express popular Ottoman literature and much of the elite's learning.

In Tunisia, Turkish became the official language, and its distinct characteristics spread throughout the country. It is the third language of Islam, after Arabic and Persian, and has "played a crucial part in the intellectual life" of Muslim civilisation for centuries. The Turks also took their popular habits, such as music, dress, and the coffee house, with them (kahvehane or "kiva han"). The fresh vigour of Turkish authority was welcomed in Tunis and other towns, and the clerical ulama praised the regime's steadiness. Despite the Ottomans' preference for the Hanifi school of law, several Maliki jurists from Tunisia were appointed to administrative and judicial positions. Despite this, foreign elites continued to control. In the countryside, well-trained Turkish forces kept the tribes under control without jeopardising relationships, but their authority was unpopular. "The Ottomans' military might allows them to restrain rather than appease the tribes. Everywhere, an image of Turkish dominance and Tunisian servitude developed." The central government has never been able to regulate the rural economy effectively. The government continued to rely on corsair attacks on Mediterranean ships for cash, a more 'profitable' activity at the time than trade. With the signing of a Spanish-Ottoman treaty in 1581, Spain's focus shifted away from the region, and corsair activity intensified.

Nonetheless, peaceful trade and commerce were harmed. The introduction of a Turkish-speaking ruling elite into Tunisia, whose institutions had controlled the government for generations, had an indirect impact on the remaining Berber-Arab split in the inhabited areas. This linguistic bipolarity had been renewed by the 11th-century invasion of the rebellious Arabic-speaking Banu Hilal. Following then, Arabic gained prominence, and Berber's use began to wane. The presence of a Turkish-speaking elite seems to expedite the submergence of the Berber language in Tunisia.

After the Ottoman Empire conquered Tunisia, the Porte installed a Pasha. "Pasha" (Trk: paşa: "head, chief") is Ottoman imperial terminology for a high post, a bearer of civil and/or military power, such as a provincial governor. Tunisia was controlled from the city of Algiers by a corsair leader with the Ottoman title of Beylerbey during its first few years under the Ottomans. When Ottoman-aligned military troops arrived in the Maghrib, the coastal areas, notably Algeria, were in political chaos and fragmentation. Algiers [ancient Ikosim], one of its quasi-independent maritime ports, was first to come under permanent Turkish authority (in 1516). Algiers gained considerable importance within the growing Turkish Empire as a result of its early conquest. Only under the Ottomans did Algiers become a popular destination. Previously, Algiers had not been very prominent, having long remained in the shadows of Tunis to the east and Tlemcen to the west. Tunisia lost the sovereignty of Constantine (in the 1520s) under early Ottoman domination. The territory was traditionally under Hafsid control, although it fell victim to raids conducted by Algiers' Beylerbey Khayr al-Din. Tunisia lost Tripoli (Tarabulus, in modern-day Libya), governed by a renegade Turkish corsair, Dragut or Turgut Reis (1551). Barbarossa Khayr al-Din, the younger Barbarossa, became the first Ottoman beylerbey in Algiers in 1518. Without the tempering opinion of a council, his reign was despotic (diwan). In 1534, as Beylerbay, he conquered Tunis and held it for barely a year. Khayr al-Din was elevated to command the Ottoman ships and left the Maghrib in 1536. Four beylerbeys reigned in Algiers and over Ottoman-controlled territories of North Africa (1536–1568). In 1568, the renegade corsair Uluj Ali (1519–1587) was named Pasha of Algiers and the city's last Beylerbey; the Porte gave him orders to take Tunis. He was possible "the biggest character in Turkish dominance" of the Maghrib and Khayr al-Din. Uluj Ali seized Tunis in 1569 and held it for four years, but in 1574 he retook control of the city. Tunis was after that ruled by Uluj Ali, the Beylerbey of Algiers until he died in 1587. After then, the position was disbanded. Because of these few brief periods of Algerian authority over Tunis in the early Ottoman era, successive Turkish rulers in Algiers attempted to exert control over Tunisian affairs by force on several occasions, such as during intra-dynasty disputes. However, Algiers' meddling was finally checked each time. The Beylerbey possessed "In the name of the Ottoman sultan, he held suzerainty over [Tunis]. [The Beylerbey] was the main Ottoman authority in the western Mediterranean, and it was in charge of fighting the Empire's Christian adversaries."

When Uluj Ali died, the Turkish sultan abolished the position, thereby stabilising the administration of the Maghriban provinces and signalling the end of the long war with Spain. In its stead, the office of the Pasha was formed to administer provincial administration in each region (modern-day Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia). As a result, a Pasha became the Ottoman administrator of Tunisia in 1587. A Bey worked under the Pasha, and one of his responsibilities was to collect state income. From 1574 until 1591, the Pasha was advised by a council (the Diwan) made up of senior Turkish soldiers (Trk: buluk-bashis) and local notables. The language was still Turkish. Thus, Tunis's administration gained some stability under Ottoman control, which was established in 1574. The fortunes of war had rendered the previous period unstable and unpredictable. The new Ottoman Pasha's hold on authority in Tunisia, however, was short-lived. Four years later, in 1591, a mutiny among the occupying Turkish soldiers (the janissaries) ushered in a new military leader, the Dey, who essentially replaced the Pasha and became Tunis's reigning authority. The Pasha remained a minor figure, but the Ottoman Porte continued to designate him from time to time. However, the Bey of Tunis added the title of Pasha to his position within a few decades, and the Bey's rising influence began to exceed that of the Dey. The Bey of Tunis eventually became the only controlling power. The Beys of Tunis were constantly wary of Ottoman attempts to weaken their political hold on power. The dignity and grandeur connected with the title of Pasha, with its direct connection to the Ottoman Caliph, whose religious importance included being the 'Commander of the Faithful,' was also a source of pride for the Beys as Muslim monarchs.

The Ottomans 1st garrisoned Tunis with Four thousand (4,000) janissaries from their occupying force in Algiers, the majority of whom were Turkish from Anatolia. Their Janissary corps was immediately under the command of their Agha (Trk: "master"). Deys (Trk: "maternal uncle") were the subordinate officers, and each Dey controlled around 100 troops. The Ottoman Porte did not retain the janissaries' ranks in Tunis following that, but its designated Pasha for Tunisia began recruiting them from various locations. The janissaries ("new troops") were an elite Ottoman governmental organisation that sprang from an older tradition. Devshirme was a procedure in which Christian adolescents were collected from Greece and the Balkans, impressed into military training, and forced to convert to Islam; when they were grown, they supplied an elite corps of soldiery. They were kept separate in their barracks and were banned from marrying. In addition, they were subjected to a stringent toilet and clothing code and Hurufi sect restrictions (later the Bektashi Sufi). Janissaries, who began as a form of enslavement in the 15th century, subsequently gained privileges and the potential to climb to high positions. The massive Kazan ("kettle") beneath which they ate and conducted business was a well-known emblem of their combined might. Muslims eventually joined, and the janissaries got the ability to marry and grew into a strong caste. If they were not appeased, they were likely to revolt and take, and "at least six Sultans were either dethroned or assassinated via their agency." Before the institution was abolished in the 19th century, "the number on the [Ottoman] payroll had reached over 130,000." The janissaries in the Ottoman-controlled Maghrib, on the other hand, were initially Turkish or Turkish-speaking. There was some competition between the janissaries and the pirates, predominantly Christian renegades and other Turks. Local tribal troops and Maghrib militias were also viewed with mistrust by the janissaries as possible enemy combatants. Nevertheless, the janissary corps, known as the ojaq, maintained a high cohesiveness and élan.

"They chose their commander-in-chief, the agha, and a diwan [council] to safeguard their group interests, and they had a strong feeling of group unity and egalitarian spirit in the ranks. Moreover, they had a privileged position in the state because they were Turkish. They were not subject to the regency's normal system of justice, and they were entitled to supplies of food, meat, and oil, as well as a regular wage and a share of the pirate profits."

The corps of janissaries in Tunisia was thought to be under the jurisdiction of the local Ottoman Pasha until 1591. In 1591, junior janissary officers (deys) toppled their senior commanders, forcing the Pasha to recognise the authority of one of their men. The Dey was the name given to this new leader, who was chosen by his fellow deys. The Dey became "virtual ruler of the country" after taking responsibility for law and order in the capital and military matters. The shift challenged the Ottoman Empire, while political authority remained in the hands of foreigners from Tunisia's standpoint. The old state diwan (council) was dissolved, but several Tunisian Maliki jurists were recruited to crucial posts to appease local sentiment (yet the Ottoman Hanafi jurists still predominated). Dey, the janissary, had a lot of discretion and was pretty free with his power, although his reach was restricted to Tunis and other cities. 'Uthman Dey and his son-in-law Yusuf Dey were two highly competent Deys. They were capable administrators who exhibited tact, increasing the office's dignity. Treasury monies were made available for public projects and new development, despite neither of them being fond of luxury (e.g., a mosque, barracks, and repair of aqueducts). Rebellious tribes were subjugated. Tunisia's lengthy period of chronic societal unrest has come to an end. Peace and order were established, as a result, allowing for some economic growth. The Qaptan of the corsair fleet and the Bey, responsible for collecting taxes, supported and relied on the Dey's governing power.

Nonetheless, numerous interest groups arose under Yusuf Dey's rule that tried to circumvent his controlling tactics. Many of these were Tunisian, such as the local military, urban notables, including the dissolved diwan, and most rural tribes; the distant sultan in Constantinople was also included, at least to some extent. During the year of 1620s and 1630s, the local Turkish Bey mobilised these societal forces, allowing him to expand his influence and eventually overtake the Dey. When an effort to reclaim power by the Dey and his janissaries in 1673 failed, it was evident that the political rule of the Dey and his janissaries had steadily ebbed away.

Piracy has been described as "an old, if not necessarily noble occupation" that has been undertaken by a diverse group of individuals at various eras and locales. The difference between a wikt: corsair (or privateer) and a pirate is that the former works with apparent official authority, whilst the latter does not. During the period of late Middle Ages and the period of Renaissance, the Mediterranean area became a hotbed of piracy (and privateering), which was perpetrated by both Christians (targeting Muslim shipping in the east) and Muslims (more active out of the Barbary Coast in the west, with its many targets of Christian merchant ships). Between 1538 and 1571, the first "great age of the Barbary corsairs" took place in the 16th century. Following their naval victory at the Preveza, Ottoman maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean was unrivalled during these decades. At Lepanto, however, Ottoman authority was effectively shattered, while Ottoman maritime strength remained strong. Corsair activity increased again in the early 17th century. Following that, rather than assaulting commercial ships one by one, Algiers began to rely on 'tribute' from European nations in exchange for safe passage. Treaties between the Ottoman Empire and European powers introduced another layer of competing diplomacy. Finally, during the conflicts that followed the French Revolution (1789–1815), Barbary corsair activity peaked temporarily before abruptly ceasing. The pre-existing Barbary corsairs' traditions and practices were changed and developed into remarkable institutions in 16th-century Algiers under the new Ottoman government. With mechanisms of recruiting, corps hierarchies, peer review, private and governmental finance, trades and materials support, coordinated operations, and resale and ransom markets, the activity became highly sophisticated. Algiers' policies established an outstanding model of corsair enterprise, which was later adopted by Tunis and Tripoli and Morocco independently.

Christian renegades (including many renowned or notorious captains), foreign Moslems (many Turkish), and a few local Maghribans made up the crews. Only Reis Hamida, a Kabyle Berber during the final years of the corsair period, was a local who rose to a high position. Captains were chosen not by the ship's owners but by a Diwan of the Riesi, and an authorised council made up of all active corsair captains. The location of one's house was also restricted. "Captains, crews, and supplies all resided near the port and docks in Algiers' western district." Corsair action was often funded by private finance. Investors were effectively purchasing stock in a particular corsair company. Traders, bureaucrats, janitors, shopkeepers, and artisans were among the investors who came from all walks of life. The funding provided the ship and personnel capital and costs, such as naval stocks and supplies, timbers and canvas, and ammunition.

"Underwriting missions was an appealing idea because of the possible riches to be gained from corsair prizes. Shareholding was structured similarly to a modern stock corporation, with individual returns based on their investment. During the 'golden era' of the seventeenth century, this sort of private investment achieved its pinnacle."

Following the "golden period" of the pirates, the state of Algiers, mainly under the authority of its Turkish janissaries, came to possess many of the corsair ships and fund many of their excursions. Strict procedures regulated the distribution of prizes obtained at sea. As Allah's state representative, next came the port officials, custom brokers, and those in charge of the sanctuaries; and last, the amount owed to the ship owners, captain, and crew. "At auction or more often to European business agents living in Algiers, via whom it may even reach the port of its intended destination," the confiscated merchant cargo was sold. The primary source of personal income in Algiers was ransom or the selling of kidnapped captives (and payload auctions). Religious groups funded and negotiated the release of hostages. The conditions of captivity varied, with the majority being forced to work as slaves.

Nonetheless, the Muslim rulers frequently gave these Christians religious rights. More than 20,000 Christian prisoners from more than a dozen nations were imprisoned in Algiers during the early 17th century. "Captives were a larger source of wealth for Barbary people than plundered goods." On the other hand, Corsair activity was never as crucial in Tunis as in Algiers for a long time.

In Tunisia, the Bey was the top official in "interior administration and tax collection." Control and collection of taxes in tribal, rural regions were among Bey's responsibilities. Armed expeditions (mahallas) patrolled the countryside twice a year, displaying the central authority's arm. The Bey had established rural cavalry (sipahis) as an auxiliary force for this purpose, primarily Arabs recruited from what became known as "government" (makhzan) tribes. Since his infancy, Ramdan Bey had supported a Corsican called Murad Curso. After Ramdan died in 1613, Murad succeeded his patron as Bey, which he held successfully from 1613 until 1631. He was eventually given the title of Pasha, which was a ceremonial status at the time, although his position as Bey remained lower than that of the Dey. With the help of local notables in Tunis, his son Hamuda Bey (r.1631–1666) obtained both the titles of Pasha and Bey. The Bey gained social status due to his relationship with the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople, thanks to his position of Pasha. When Dey died in 1640, Hamuda Bey attempted to gain control over nominations to that post. As a result, the Bey ascended to the position of ultimate ruler of Tunisia. The Diwan resumed its role as a council of notables under Murad II Bey (reigned 1666–1675), Hamuda's son.

However, in 1673, the janissary deys rose in revolt as their power dwindled. The janissaries and urban troops commanded by the deys battled against the Muradid Beys. They were supported by primarily rural forces led by tribal shaykhs and popular backing from city notables throughout the subsequent fighting. In the same way that the Beys triumphed, the pastoral Bedouin leaders and Tunisian dignitaries succeeded. As a result, the Arabic language was reintroduced as an official language in the region.

Nonetheless, the Muradids used Turkish in the central administration, emphasising their aristocratic position and Ottoman ties. Internal strife within the Muradid dynasty erupted after Murad II Bey's death, resulting in the military conflict known as the Tunisian Revolutions or the Muradid War of Succession (1675-1705). Later, Algeria's Turkish overlords intervened in favour of one side in this domestic dispute; these Algerian soldiers remained after the combat slowed, which was unpopular. Thus, the terrible state of civil unrest in Tunisia, as well as Algerian meddling, remained. Ibrahim Sharif killed the last Muradid Bey in 1702 and reigned for several years with Algerian support. As a result, the Muradid Beys' dynasty can be traced from 1640 until 1702.

During the Muradid era (c. the 1630s–1702), a steady economic transition occurred, with corsair raids decreasing owing to European pressure and commercial commerce centred on agricultural products (primarily grains) increasing due to the integration of the rural people into regional networks. European maritime firms, on the other hand, continued to carry Mediterranean commerce. To get the most out of the export sector, the Beys established government monopolies that acted as a middleman between local manufacturers and foreign merchants. As a result, Tunisia's rulers and commercial partners (who were chosen from foreign-dominated elites with ties to the Turkish-speaking governing caste) received a disproportionate percentage of the country's trading revenues. This hampered the growth of local commercial interests, whether they were rural landowners or affluent merchants. The socioeconomic gap continued, with Tunisia's powerful families referred to as a "Turkish" governing caste.